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Android – A Linux based operating system optimized for mobile devices, including 
smartphones and tablets (Daniel, 2009). 
Android Device – A computing device, including but not limited to smartphones and 
tablets, which runs the Android operating system (Daniel, 2009). 
Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) – A type of digital cellular network, designed by 
Qualcomm, which spreads data across the entire available bandwidth (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2007). 
Electronic Evidence – “Information and data of investigative value that is stored on or 
transmitted by an electronic device” (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2007). 
Encryption – “Any procedure used in cryptography to convert plain text into cipher text 
to prevent anyone but the intended recipient from reading that data” (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2007). 
File System – “A software mechanism that defines the way that files are named, stored, 
organized, and accessed on logical volumes of partitioned memory” (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2007). 
Forensic Computing – The process of identifying, preserving, analyzing, and presenting 
digital evidence in a manner that is legally acceptable (McKemmish, 1999).
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Forensic Copy – “An accurate bit-for-bit reproduction of the information contained on an 
electronic device or associated media, whose validity and integrity has been 
verified using an accepted algorithm” (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2007). 
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) – Cellular system designed in Europe 
which is used worldwide and employs the use of a SIM card (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, 2007). 
Hash – A mathematical function which converts digital information into a fixed length 
value.  It should be computationally infeasible to derive the original information 
from the hash value.  It should also be computationally infeasible to find any two 
digital messages with the same resulting hash values.  Two example hash 
functions are MD5 and SHA256 (Thompson, 2005). 
Personal Information Management (PIM) – “Data that contains personal information, 
such as: calendar entries, to-do lists, memos, reminders, etc” (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, 2010). 
RSA Algorithm – A cryptographic scheme developed by Rivest, Shamir and 
Adlemanwhich is the algorithm of choice for many online data communications, 
including  financial transactions and secure electronic mail (Robinson, 2003). 
Root – In Linux, root is a user with top privileges.  To “root” a device or “gain root 
privileges” is to run a process as root.  Root can also refer to the top level 
directory of a device.  The directory “/” is the root directory.  The directory 




Signature – “Digital signatures provide authenticity and nonrepudiation of electronic 
legal documents” (Boneh, 1999). 
Smartphone – “A full-featured mobile phone that provides users with personal computer 
like functionality by incorporating PIM applications, enhanced Internet 
connectivity and email operating over and Operating System supported by 
accelerating processing and larger storage capacity compared with present cellular 
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Android devices are extremely popular and are projected to stay popular.  Both forensic 
tools and malware exist designed specifically for Android devices.  The purpose of this 
study is to explore a new method of loading forensic tools and malware to Android 
devices.  This new method is the update module, which is used to install updates to the 
operating system.  This thesis proposed and completed research to test four different 
custom update packages on three different Android devices.  Two of the update packages 
contain forensic utilities and the other two contain malicious tools.  An update package 
collecting web history using the device’s API successfully executed on all three devices, 
and the other three update packages only successfully executed on the oldest device, a 
Nexus One.  The cause for the differing results from the Nexus One to the other two 
devices is the version of the operating system on the device.  The Nexus One ran the 
oldest version of Android which did not contain the same security measures as the newer 
operating systems on the other two devices.  The newer devices had these security 
measures which stopped the update packages from executing successfully.  The 





CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The Android operating system, designed for smartphones and other mobile devices, 
is the most popular mobile operating system in the United States (Eadicicco, 2012).  This 
operating system now accounts for half of current American smartphones in use (Weiss, 
2012) and continues to see growth.  The Android platform is also a popular platform for 
developers, as over 600,000 apps are in the “Play Store”, or the market for downloading 
apps (Fingas, 2012). 
As long as consumers, including criminals, use these devices, law enforcement 
must be capable of extracting data of a forensic interest from these smartphones.  This 
personal data, such as contacts, text messages, web history, and call logs, can be 
extracted using commercial forensic tools.  Many of these tools are evaluated in the book 
Android Forensics:  Investigation, Analysis, and Mobile Security for Google Android 
(Hoog, 2011).  The book states that the only requirement for these tools is that USB 
debugging, a setting allowing for apps to be installed via a Universal Serial Bus (USB) 
connection, is enabled.  If the phone is screen locked, the investigator does not know the 
pass code, and USB debugging is not enabled, then USB debugging cannot be enabled 
and these tools cannot be used.  Hoog's book details some methods of circumventing the 
pass code, though it acknowledges that pass code bypasses are not consistently reliable. 
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 “While there is no guaranteed method, there are a number of techniques have have 
worked in certain situations” (Hoog, 2011 p. 203). 
With the popularity of the Android device on the rise (Weiss, 2012), mobile 
malware aimed at this operating system is also becoming more common.  Mobile 
malware attacks are aimed largely at Android devices, as around three quarters of all 
examples of mobile malware are designed for the Android operating system (Greenberg, 
2012). 
These concerns present a need for security experts to understand these devices.  
This study presents a previously unexplored method of attacking Android devices.  This 
attack can be used for benevolent purposes, such as extracting data from the device to 
assist law enforcement, or malevolent purposes, such as installing malware. 
This chapter introduces the topic presented in this study, along with the scope, 
significance, and boundaries of the research to be performed 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Android devices, including smartphones and tablets, contain a recovery mode for 
updating the operating system and firmware.  This module can be exploited for other 
purposes.  These purposes can be beneficial or they can be malicious.  For this research, 
update packages which are considered beneficial are those which the law enforcement 
community could potentially use for extracting data from a suspect’s Android device in a 
forensically sound fashion.  Update packages which are considered malicious are those 
which can carry out malicious tasks, including planting evidence on a device or adding 
malware.  Custom update packages can be written for these purposes, creating a 
vulnerability that has not been explored.  This study answers the following question:  can 
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update packages be used to deliver malicious payloads and/or utilities beneficial for a 
forensic investigation on current Android devices? 
1.3 Significance of the Problem 
As discussed in Chapter 2, most commercial Android forensic tools operate on a 
live device and depend on the user having the ability to install an application on the 
device.  If the device is locked and the password is unknown, and USB debug mode is 
disabled, forensic tools are rendered useless on Android devices.  The forensic aspects of 
this research demonstrate a method to circumvent this shortcoming of Android forensic 
tools.  The criminal aspects of this research demonstrate abilities to attack a device in 
novel, potentially frightening ways.  These innovations make this study significant. 
Android devices are very popular; over half of smartphones users in America now 
use Android phones (Weiss, 2012).  The International Data Corporation projects Android 
to remain the top mobile operating system through at least 2016 (International Data 
Corporation, 2012).  With this many phones running Android being sold, this study is 
significant. 
Like other smartphones and tablets, Android devices contain a wealth of 
information about the user (Hoog, 2011).  Besides containing the normal phone 
information, including contact lists, phone calls, and text messages, an Android 
smartphone contains calendars of the user’s activities, web browsing activity, 
applications, multimedia files, and more (Daniel, 2009).  This amount of evidence readily 
available in Android devices makes this study significant.  Android tablets contain a great 
amount of personal information, including calendar entries, web history, e-mail, office 
documents, and more. 
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1.4 Purpose of the Study 
This study is aimed at documenting a previously unexplored attack vector present 
in nearly all Android devices.  As stated in Chapter 2, nearly all Android devices have a 
recovery mode.  This study is aimed at both documenting this attack vector and 
determining the effectiveness of procedures, both benevolent and malevolent, on the 
devices.  This is not an endorsement of a forensic procedure or a study of admissibility of 
a forensic procedure.  The goal is to create a study useful for academics, security experts, 
and Android enthusiasts while creating awareness of the possibilities of attacking an 
Android phone through its recovery mode. 
1.5 Assumptions 
This study contains a few assumptions.  It is assumed that the Android devices used 
are in good working order.  This includes the “factory reset” functionality, which is used 
to set the devices to a known state.  It is assumed that a “factory reset” is a reliable way to 
return a device to a known state.  Since a version of the Android operating system was 
built and installed on each smartphone and tablet, it is assumed that the download of the 
source code, compilation of the operating system, and uploading of the operating system 
to the device all goes smoothly.  It is assumed that the all software tools used in this 
research work properly.  Three different devices which each ran a different version of the 
Android operating system were used.  It is assumed that each device well represents other 
Android devices which run the same version of the operating system.  Also, it is assumed 
that the variety of the devices chosen allowed for the results of this study to be applicable 
to Android devices in general, as opposed to only the devices selected for this study.  As 
discussed in Chapter 2, other Android related studies did not include the variety of 
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devices, in terms of manufacturer and operating system version, that were chosen for this 
study. 
1.6 Delimitations 
This study is a proof of concept study.  This is not intended to be an analysis of a 
tool which is ready to be used by a broad community.  Given this delimitation, a formal 
admissibility study is not discussed, but the sizes of the update packages and their 
impacts on the device are discussed. 
This study is neither aimed at identifying the locations of interest of files on 
Android devices nor producing new forensic tools or malware.  New attacks are revealed 
in this study, but this is not intended to be used as a guide for securing a handheld device; 
instead, this is meant to demonstrate some previously unexplored capabilities of a 
specific exploit of the device. 
Three different devices were chosen for this study, each of which run a different 
version of Android.  This is intended to give a representative sample of Android devices. 
1.7 Limitations 
As stated in Chapter 3, the researcher modeled an original equipment manufacturer 
(OEM) when completing this study.  Only a certain set of devices were analyzed.  The 
justification for these specific devices is in Chapter 2.  A limitation of this research is the 
devices chosen.  The devices do represent three different manufacturers, three different 
versions of the Android operating system, and two different form factors, but only three 
devices were picked.  These three were all freely available to the researcher.  Finances 
limited the device selection, so only three devices were used in this study.  Due to 
constraints of availability, the smartphones available are all GSM.  No CDMA Android 
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smartphones are available to the researcher which satisfy the requirements.  These device 
limitations do not substantially affect the results of this research as three different 
manufacturers and operating system versions are represented in these devices.  While a 
great wealth of goals, both forensic or malevolent in nature, can be achieved through 
creating custom update packages, only a small set of focused tasks is represented.  One of 
the tests in this study involves creating a bitstream image of the device.  When creating a 
bitstream image of a hard drive, the image is traditionally deemed authentic by 
calculating a hash of both the original hard drive and the image and compare for accuracy.  
The device which is image cannot be hashed in this manner as the device is powered on 
and constantly changing.  This presents a limitation in determining accuracy of the 
created bitstream image.  Other methods of determining accuracy, including verifying the 





CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The Android platform has gained a great amount of popularity since its initial release 
in 2008.  With that popularity comes an interest in forensic extractions of data from the 
devices.  Also, an interest in the development and the spread of malware arises.  The 
method used in this research requires technical knowledge regarding the Android 
recovery mode and creating custom update packages; this technical knowledge is found 
online in technically-oriented websites.  The method for this study is similar to methods 
used in other Android forensics papers.  In many ways, this method is more thorough 
than the methods used in these other papers.  The devices chosen for this study support 
the methodology. 
2.1 Android 
Android is not a phone; it is an operating system. In 2005, Google acquired 
Android Inc, which at the time was a 22 month old company based in California that had 
been operating "under a cloak of secrecy" (Elgin, 2005). Common speculation was that 
Google had interest in the hardware of phones, but their focus was to instead develop an 
Android operating system for mobile phones and release it for free (Daniel, 2009). On 
September 23, 2008, T-Mobile announced the forthcoming release of the G1.  Billed as 
the world's first Android powered phone, it was manufactured by HTC (HTC 
Corporation).  The G1 sold around one million units in the United States, leading to the 
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release of the G2, the successor to the G1; the G2 sold around one million units in its first 
month (Daniel, 2009). 
Mobile phone manufacturers would either spend a great amount of time and money 
developing their own operating systems or purchase one for a hefty price.  With the 
availability of the Android operating system, manufacturers can have a full operating 
system ready for their phones at a lower cost. Manufacturers can either launch Android 
on phone hardware as is or they may modify and customize it for their own needs (Daniel, 
2009), such as with the Motorola Droid or the Nexus One, sold by Google and 
manufactured by HTC. 
Data is stored on the phone in Android powered phones in a simple file structure, 
and most data about the user is stored in a root level folder called /data.  While many 
other root level folders exist, this is the root directory of most importance to a forensic 
investigator (Mohindra, 2008). 
The file system initially utilized by the Android operating system was YAFFS2, or 
Yet Another Flash File System 2 (Hoog, 2009).  This is an open source file system that is 
found on some flash devices.  Data is retained on the device longer than on other, more 
traditional file systems.  Most computers cannot natively read a YAFFS2 image, but the 
unyaffs2 utility, available on Google Code, can be used to extract data from a YAFFS2 
image (Penguin.lin, 2012).  Newer phones have been using EXT4 as a file system instead.  
This file system can be read natively in Linux and can be read with most computer 
forensic tools, such as FTK Imager (Hoog, 2011). 
2010 sales for Android increased worldwide over 800% from the previous year; 
Android’s market share of operating systems jumped from 3.9% to 22.7% (Wilcox, 2011).  
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During the year, sales of phones running Android surpassed sales of iPhones (Burnette, 
2010).  In July 2012, Android passed a major milestone when a report showed that just 
over 50% of U.S. smartphone owners use Android devices (Weiss, 2012). 
2.1.1 Android Forensics 
There are companies which develop mobile forensic products which support 
Android powered devices.  These products include Oxygen Forensic Suite (Oxygen 
Software Company, 2011), Paraben Device Seizure (Paraben Corporation, 2011), .XRY 
by Micro Systemation AB (Micro Systemation AB, 2011), Universal Forensic Extraction 
Device (UFED) by Cellebrite (Cellebrite Mobile Synchronization LTD, 2011), and 
AFLogical by viaForensics (ViaForensics, 2011). 
There are two papers regarding testing of Android tools aimed at comparing these 
tools to each other and the completeness of the results they obtain.  One work, appearing 
in the book Android Forensics:  Investigation, Analysis, and Mobile Security for Google 
Android, tests several different tools on a Motorola Droid.  It was noted that only one 
phone was used, and neither the phone nor the SD Card were “cleaned” between testing 
(Hoog, 2011).  Another study utilized two different phones, both by Motorola, and tested 
three different tools (Kovacik & O'Day, 2010).  This paper proposed a methodology 
regarding investigating Android phones quickly and inexpensively; however, the authors 
did not mention that in order to create a complete backup of the phone to examine the 
storage at a bitstream level, an alternative recovery program, such as ClockworkMod, 
must be installed. 
Mobile phones can be analyzed at a bitstream level by physically taking the 
device apart and analyzing the chips which store data; this method is not limited solely to 
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Android devices (Mooij, 2010).  This process is considered to be quite effective, but it is 
expensive and requires an examiner with the proper skills (Hoog, 2011). 
There is not a great amount of academic literature regarding Android forensics, 
but some documents do exist.  One paper explores the issue of rooting a phone, then 
analyzes three different methods of forensic acquisitions of potential data:  physical 
imaging (which requires rooting the phone), logical acquisition of certain files (which 
requires rooting the phone), and using a Cellebrite kit to acquire data from the phone 
(Lessard & Kessler, 2010).  Another article deals with anti-forensics, as opposed to 
forensics.  This discusses methods of clearing out evidence effectively and efficiently 
using a tool called AFDroid (Distefano, Me, & Gianluigi, 2010).  Mohindra (2008) 
discusses both the Android architecture and Android forensics.  The discussion of 
evidence acquisition utilizes the Android Debug Bridge, which requires the device to be 
set to allow USB debugging.  Removing key user files cannot be done using Android 
Debug Bridge from an actual device as permissions forbid this; however, this acquisition 
can be completed from a virtual machine device, which is a tool intended for Android 
developers, as done in this paper. 
As mentioned, there is an Android forensics book available with much great 
information regarding the operating system, acquisition of data, and investigations (Hoog, 
2011).  This book covers some Android forensic tools, along with other methods, 
including potential methods to bypass a screen lock, extracting data from the Android 
Debug Bridge, and imaging the included SD card. 
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2.1.2 Android Malware 
Android malware is a concern for security experts.  A 2012 study concluded that 
around 75% of malware targeted at mobile devices is designed for the Android operating 
system (Greenberg, 2012).  Security experts recently discovered legitimate-appearing 
applications which download malware to the mobile device, and these applications could 
have been downloaded to up to 100,000 devices (Naraine, 2012).  F-Secure Labs, a 
security firm, discovered 51,447 pieces of malware for Android in third quarter 2012 (F-
Secure Labs, 2012).   
A 2013 report by Commtouch, an Internet security company, detailed the number 
of unique instances of Android malware discovered, and these numbers were 
significantly higher than those of F-Secure Labs.  In January 2013 alone, over 178,000 
unique malware samples for Android were discovered (Commtouch, 2013).  This was 
actually lower than the December 2012 findings of over 214,000, which, according to the 
report, “may have been an anomaly.”  With the exception of December 2012, the number 
of unique pieces of malware discovered by Commtouch rose every month from July 2012 
to January 2013.  Given these numbers, Android malware, its spread, and mitigations 
must be a focus of research for mobile security experts. 
2.2 Background of the Methodology 
The following sections provide background information for the methodology used 
in this study.  The researcher was unable to find any published academic papers regarding 
the technical aspects of this research, so the information in this section is derived from 
technical sources on the Internet. 
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2.2.1 Android Recovery Mode 
According to Android developer documentation, the recovery system is “the 
separate partition that can be used to install system updates, wipe user data, etc” (Android, 
2012).  The researcher has personally used and explored many Android devices, perhaps 
as many as 50, and the only of these which did not have a recovery mode were from 
untrustworthy manufacturers, shipped from China, and sold inexpensively on eBay.  All 
of the devices the researcher has used which were manufactured by reputable 
manufacturers, including Motorola, HTC, Samsung, LG, and Asus, contained recovery 
modes. 
Recovery mode is accessed after the phone has been powered off.  A combination 
of buttons is used to power on the device into recovery mode, and this button 
combination is different phone device to device.  To boot into Recovery Mode on the 
Galaxy Nexus, the user needs to power the device off, then hold both volume buttons and 
the power button, and then choose from an on screen menu to boot into recovery mode 
(Verizon, n.d.). 
The default recovery mode for Android devices includes four options:  reboot the 
system, apply an update, wipe data / factory reset, and wipe the cache partition (Verizon, 
n.d.).  Any update package must be digitally signed to be installed in the Android 
recovery mode, and the signature is verified before installation (Android, 2012).  The 
wipe data / factory reset functionality is defined in Android documentation as “reboots 
the device and wipes the user data partition. This is sometimes called a 'factory reset', 
which is something of a misnomer because the system partition is not restored to its 
factory state” (Android, 2012).  In this study, the phrases “factory reset” or “reset to a 
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factory state” refer to this functionality.  As stated in Chapter 1, an assumption of this 
research is that a “factory reset” is a reliable way to return a device to a known state. 
2.2.2 Alternate Recovery Mode 
An alternate recovery mode, such as ClockworkMod, can be installed on many 
Android devices (ClockworkMod, n.d.).  This has additional features beyond the standard 
recovery mode, including the ability to bypass signature verification when installing 
update packages and Android Debug Bridge connectivity, which allows access to a shell 
with root privileges (Xda Developers, n.d.).  The Android recovery mode is installed on 
devices by default, so the user must add ClockworkMod or an equivalent recovery mode 
to access its extra functionality (ClockworkMod, n.d.).  This study does not use 
alternative recovery modes.  Instead, this study explores an exploit in the default recovery 
mode.  If a device happens to have ClockworkMod installed, the device can simply be 
connected to a computer and accessed via a root shell using the Android Debug Bridge.  
With this connectivity, all of the objectives in this research can be performed.  One 
should not assume that a device examined for an investigation has an alternative recovery 
mode; one must assume that the default recovery mode is on the device. 
2.2.3 Android Updates  
Official system updates are distributed to Android as zip files which are digitally 
signed to prove authenticity (Android, 2012).  These zip files are distributed through the 
cellular network, or they can be downloaded to the device and installed manually using 
the recovery mode (Imran, 2012). 
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2.2.3.1 Writing Custom Updates 
Developers can write custom update packages.  These update packages can be 
found on the Internet to root a device (IndefactorX, 2009) or to install a custom recovery 
mode (ClockworkMod, n.d.).  These are not the only two possible uses for a custom 
update package, but there are many such downloads on the Internet. 
The structure of update packages is consistent from one update zip file to the next.  
At the root of the zip file is a directory META-INF.  Within are three files, CERT.RSA, 
CERT.SF, and MANIFEST.MF, which are created during the package signing process 
and contain both the signature created from the private key of the signer and a list of all 
contained files with a hash of each file (Yang, 2012).  Within this directory is a directory 
structure of com/google/android, and within the android folder are two files, update-
binary and updater-script.  The file update-binary is a binary which need not be changed 
from one update package to the next.  The script updater-script follows a distinct 
scripting language (Londatiga, 2010).  This script can be edited using any text editor and 
will change from one update package to the next.  Also at the root directory, alongside 
the META-INF directory, can be other files used in the update, such as files to be 
installed on the phone or even entire directories (McGhee, 2010). 
2.2.3.2 Signing Update Packages 
As stated above, updates must be digitally signed to be installed in the Android 
recovery mode, and the signing process adds three files to the update package.  These are 
signed using a Java jar file called signapk.jar, which can be used to digitally sign Android 
update packages or Android apk files for instaling applications (Atomicdryad, 2010).  
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These update packages are RSA signed with a private key, which the original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM) is responsible for securing (Android, n.d.).  The matching public 
key is located on the device at /system/etc/security/otacerts.zip; if the signature of the 
update package matches the public key on the device, the update package is verified and 
installed (Android, 2012.). 
2.2.4 General Method 
The general method for this study revolves around comparing a device in a known 
state to the device in a new state after performing a specific task.  For each of the devices 
used in this study and for each update package tested, the device began in a known state.  
To create a known state for the device, the device had been reset to a factory state using 
built in functionality and was next populated with a specific set of data.  This data 
included web browsing and installing apps.  The device was then booted into recovery 
mode and executed an update with one of the update packages created for this study.  The 
device was then rebooted and the new state of the device after executing the update 
package was compared to the known state of the device.  This method was repeated 
multiple times for each device and for each update package. 
This method is similar to a chapter in Hoog's book Android Forensics:  
Investigation, Analysis, and Mobile Security for Google Android.  This chapter includes a 
study of several mobile forensics tools for Android.  The device, a Motorola Droid, was 
populated to a known state.  Several mobile forensics tools were tested on the device.  
The results produced by those forensics tools were analyzed and compared to the Droid 
in the known state. 
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There are three key differences between the study in Hoog's book and this 
research.  This research used three different devices by three different manufacturers, but 
the study in the book used one device.  This research repeated each test on each device 
five times, but the study in the book only ran each test once on the device.  Also, the 
method for this research included completing a factory reset before each repetition and 
populating the device with a specific set of data, where the study in the book's method 
involved populating the device once and then running one test after another on the device.  
This third difference allowed the researcher a better view of what is on the device in this 
research.  The devices were populated with an exact known set.  In the study in the book, 
the researcher could not account for changes made by a forensic tool.  Each forensic tool 
would analyze the device as it existed after the previous tool was run on the device, so the 
device was no longer in a known state. 
Another paper (Kovacik & O'Day, 2010) also analyzed computer forensic tools 
and contained the same issue as the previous paper of not starting the device before a test 
at a completely known state.  Three computer forensic tools were run on two different 
devices, both by Motorola.  Besides the three forensics tools, the researchers also 
performed “manual forensics,” which involves obtaining a bitstream image of the device 
and using traditional forensic tools, including file carving and a hex editor, to perform an 
examination. 
The Kovacik & O'Day method did not involve any repetition, unlike this research.  
Also, this method does not begin with each device in a completely known state.  The 
paper states “forensic artifacts within the phone were initially counted and each 
methodology was compared based on what artifacts it could find.”  This implies that the 
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researchers did not have complete control over the contents of the device.  Also, the 
paper states that the researchers “had no way to ensure that no data was altered or 
changed on each device as various methodologies were utilized, as each methodology 
typically involved changing data on the phones in some way, shape, or form. Thus it is 
possible that the quantity of a certain forensic artifact changed during the research 
process.”  This methodology in this research includes resetting each device to a 
completely known state before running a test, so the researcher knew the state of the 
device without question before running each test.  Also of note in the Kovacik & O'Day 
paper is the manual forensics method, which included obtaining a bitstream image of the 
device.  This requires either rooting the device or installing a custom recovery mode, 
such as ClockworkMod; the researchers did not specify exactly how they obtained the 
bitstream image. 
A third Android paper (Distefano, Me, & Gianluigi, 2010) used a similar process to 
this research.  This paper regards anti-forensics techniques for Android devices.  A single 
Samsung device was used to run experiments to determine the effectiveness of anti-
forensics tools.  These tools were designed to remove evidence from a device.  Two 
different experiments were run.  The first experiment, testing the evidence export process, 
is as follows: 
· Obtain a bitstream image of the device 
· Execute the anti-forensics tool being tested 
· Run a commercial mobile forensics tool on the device 
· Obtain a second bitstream image of the device 
The second experiment process, testing the evidence destruction process, is as follows: 
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· Obtain a bitstream image of the device 
· Execute the anti-forensics tool being tested 
· Obtain a second bitstream image of the device 
· Uninstall the anti-forensics tool 
· Run a commercial mobile forensics tool on the device 
· Obtain a third bitstream image of the device 
These methods created a bitstream image of the device before testing.  A set of tests 
was performed on the device, then another bitstream image was created.  This process 
allowed the second bitstream image to be compared to the first so changes to the device 
could be identified.  This process is similar to the method used in this research.  Instead 
of obtaining a bitstream image of the device and using this image as a known state, the 
devices were populated to a known state.  Instead of creating a second bitstream image of 
the device to compare to the first bitstream image of the device, certain observations, 
specified in Chapter 3, were noted for each test.  Both methods involve comparing the 
results of a test on a device to a known state of the device before the test.  The process of 
obtaining a bitstream image in the Distefano, Me, & Gianluigi paper required installing 
an alternative recovery mode on the device.  This was not performed in this research 
since the Android recovery mode was used in this method. 
2.2.5 Devices 
The methodology for this research allowed the researcher to act as an OEM.  The 
OEM maintains the private key used to sign updates which the device can install.  Should 
this private key be compromised, anybody with the required technical knowledge can 
build update packages similar to what are tested in this study.  The researcher designed a 
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methodology allowing for this private key to sign update packages, so the builds of 
Android used must include the matching public key.  The way the researcher is going 
about this is to build Android from source code.  Google supports these builds for some 
devices, so the devices selected for this study are from these supported devices. 
The Android source code is open, and instructions to build it are online (Android, n.d., 
Building for devices).  As seen on the referenced website, only a specific set of devices 
are supported.  Drivers for these devices are available online (Google, 2012), and these 
must be included in any Android builds.  Ten such devices are supported as follows 
(Google, 2012): 
· Nexus 10 
· Nexus 7 (Wi-Fi) 
· Galaxy Nexus (GSM/HSPA+) 
· Galaxy Nexus (Verizon) 
· Nexus S 
· Nexus S 4G 
· Motorola Xoom (US Wi-Fi) 
· Nexus One 
· Motorola Xoom (Verizon) 
· Galaxy Nexus (Sprint) 
Three of these devices were chosen to represent three different manufacturers, three 
different versions of Android, and two different form factors.  The first device is the 
Nexus One.  Gingerbread, or Android 2.3, was built and installed on this device.  This 
smartphone was released in January 2010 and was manufactured by HTC.  The second 
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device is a Nexus S.  Ice Cream Sandwich, or Android 4.0, was built and installed on this 
device.  This smartphone was released in late 2010 by Samsung.  The final device, a 
tablet, is the Xoom.  Jelly Bean, or Android 4.1, was built and installed on this device.  
The Xoom was released in 2011 by Motorola. 
Building Android for these three devices allowed the researcher to act as an OEM and 
have access to the private key used to sign software updates.  This private key was used 
to sign the custom update packages. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for research began with building the Android operating system for 
each device.  To reflect the nature of the power which original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs) have in possessing private keys for these devices, the researcher imitated an 
OEM by building from source the operating system for each device.  Specific tasks, both 
of a benevolent and malevolent nature, were executed for each device.  Details of this 
methodology are discussed in this chapter.  
3.1 Research Devices 
Chapter 2 details the research devices and the justification for these three devices.  
The three devices used were an HTC Nexus One running Android 2.3, a Samsung Nexus 
S running Android 4.0, and a Motorola Xoom running Android 4.1.  The following 





Figure 3.1 Photograph of the Three Research Devices 
3.2 Research Computer 
The Android operating system must be downloaded and built for each device.  A 
64-bit workstation running Ubuntu 10.04 was used.  Long before this research was 
proposed, this workstation was prepared for Android builds, which required installing a 
lot of prerequisites (Android, n.d., Initializing a build environment).This system has been 
used by the researcher on many previous projects for building versions of the Android 
operating system.  The source code for the three versions of Android represented in this 
research was downloaded using the repo tool as specified by the instructions online 
(Android, n.d., Downloading the source tree).  The three different versions of Android 
were compiled for the three specific devices and installed using the fastboot tool, as 
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specified online (Android, n.d., Building for devices).  This workstation was also used for 
writing Android update packages. 
A laptop was also available.  This machine also ran Ubuntu 10.04 and was used to 
write Android applications.  This is a 32-bit machine that has been used by the researcher 
in the past to develop Android applications using the Android software development kit.  
As specified online, the Eclipse development environment, the Android Developer Tools, 
and the Android Software Development Kit were installed on this laptop (Android, n.d., 
Get the Android SDK). 
The Android build for each device included certain private keys which were stored 
on the workstation.  As stated in Chapter 2, The OEM is capable of designing official 
system updates.  The OEM maintains the private key for signing these update packages, 
so one can reason that the OEM is also capable of designing the update packages used in 
this study.  It is highly unlikely that the OEM would ever release updates created with 
malicious intent.  If the private key were to compromised, either by a network intrusion 
or a rouge employee, or if the private key were reverse engineered, a trained individual is 
capable of creating these update packages. 
3.3 Specific Update Packages 
Four specific update packages each representing a specific task were created for 
each device, resulting in twelve total packages.  Though each specific task was packaged 
differently for each device, the packaging process was very similar from device to device.  
This means that the package used to complete one goal on the Nexus One was similar to 
the packages to complete the same goal delivered to the Nexus S and the Xoom.  The first 
two of these packages represent tasks which would be beneficial for law enforcement.  
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The second two represent malicious attacks on the user.  Criteria for success were defined 
for each update package.  If the update package executed as specified, it was executed 
successfully.  Any other results were considered a failure. 
3.3.1 Forensic Image of the Device 
The first package delivered to each phone was designed to create a forensic image 
of the device.  The package contained an application written using the Android software 
development kit, plus a root exploit.  The applications were all written for the 2.3 version 
of Android, as all of the devices ran Android 2.3 or above.  The package first rooted the 
device using the packaged exploit, then placed the application in the /system/app 
directory.  Application files placed here are automatically installed upon boot.  This 
application, requiring root privileges, was designed to start at boot and create a bitstream 
image of the device's userdata partition and place this image on the device's external 
storage media. 
3.3.2 Limited Extraction of Data 
The second package was designed to extract a limited set of data.  This was 
designed to extract only the device's web browsing history.  This update installed an 
agent on the device which, at boot, used the Android API to extract history from the 
device's web browser and write to the SD card.  This is similar to how the current 
Android forensic tools in the study in Hoog's Android Forensics:  Investigation, Analysis, 
and Mobile Security for Google Android operate.  The forensic tools examined in the 
study install agent applications on the device which leverage the device’s API to perform 
an extraction of data (Hoog, 2011).  This update application also installs an application 
which leverages the device’s API, but it is delivered via an update package, which is not 
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how the tools in this study are delivered.  Unlike those tools, the application written for 
this study was only focused on extracting web history. 
3.3.3 Evidence Planting 
The third package is the first one which is malicious to the user.  The researcher 
needed a copy of the device’s web browsing history file.  A bitstream image of the 
userdata partition was created using the first update package, if the first update package 
was successfully executed.  The researcher had this image available and needed a web 
browsing history file from the device, so the researcher extracted the web browsing 
history file from this image.  (If the first update package was not completed successfully, 
this file could be obtained in another fashion.  This first update package included rooting 
the device, and if the device is rooted then individual files or an entire image of the 
device can be extracted (Lessard & Kessler, 2010)).  The researcher extracted the device's 
web browsing history and inserted browsing history entries of the device browsing three 
websites which the device did not browse to.  This modified web browsing history file 
was placed into an update package.  The update package mounted the userdata partition 
as read/write, then overwrote the web browsing history with this file.  This update 
package represents malicious evidence planting designed to make it appear as though the 
user browsed to websites with suspicious, or even illegal, content. 
3.3.4 Malware Installation 
An application representing a piece of malware was written using the Android 
software development kit.  This piece of malware was designed to start at boot and 
download a file from the Internet.  The application was designed to download the file to 
the device without the user's expressed consent.  The update package placed this 
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malicious application in the /system/app directory, and when the phone booted, this 
application was installed.  This represented malware on the device which uses the 
network connectivity without the user's knowledge, and this can cost the user money if 
the file is downloaded over the device's 3G or 4G connection. 
3.4 Detailed Methodology 
The following sections discuss the detailed methods used in this research, along 
with what data was collected. 
3.4.1 Building the Operating System 
Using the research computer, three builds of the Android operating system were 
made.  They were Gingerbread, or Android 2.3, for the Nexus One, Ice Cream Sandwich, 
or Android 4.0, for the Nexus S, and Jelly Bean, or Android 4.1, for the Xoom.  These 
were built for “user,” as opposed to for “userdebug.”  The latter is for research purposes 
and the resulting build includes root privileges; the former represents a build similar to 
what would be found on a device sold in a store, with no root privileges.  The process of 
downloading the source and building for a device followed the documentation as 
discussed in Chapter 2.  The researcher noted the public keys included in each build in 
the /system/etc/security/otacerts.zip file as discussed in Chapter 2 and ensured that the 
matching private keys were available. 
3.4.2 Building the Update Packages 
The four update packages described in the previous section were created for each 
of the three devices, resulting in twelve update packages.  Each package was signed with 
a private key using the RSA algorithm as discussed in Chapter 2.  The exact signing 
statement was as follows: 
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java -Xmx1024m -jar signapk.jar -w testkey.x509.pem testkey.pk8 update.zip 
update-signed.zip 
In this script, signapk.jar is a Java executable jar which can sign updates or 
applications as needed.  The testkey.x509.pem and testkey.pk8 represent the private 
certificate to sign the update, update.zip is the original unsigned package, and update-
signed.zip is the resulting signed update. 
3.4.3 Executing the Update Packages 
For each update package and each device, the device must be prepared and 
populated with a specific set of data.  The phone was reset to factory state and then 
populated with a specific set of data so the device remained in a known state before each 
update package execution.  The update package was added to the device.  The device was 
powered off and booted into recovery mode, where the update was executed.  A specific 
set of criteria, written in the following sections, was defined for each update package; if 
these criteria were met, the update was executed successfully, and if any other results 
were noted, the update was not executed successfully.  The device was powered back on 
and analyzed to see if the update was successfully executed.  Each execution was noted 
as successful or non-successful, and if the update was executed unsuccessfully, notes 





Figure 3.2 Chart of Methodology for One Device and One Package 
 
For each of the four updates and three devices, this cycle was repeated five times 
for a set of 60 executions.   The cycle was repeated multiple times in order to observe a 
trend of results instead of simply an anomaly.  The following sections describe the 
population of each device and specific success criteria for each update package. 
3.4.3.1 Forensic Image of the Device 
Before executing the update package to create a forensic image of the userdata 
partition of the device, the device must be in a known state.  The device was reset to 
factory state.  The applications Astro File Browser and the Holy Bible were installed on 
the device.  The web browser browsed to the websites www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and www.nfl.com. 
The update package was loaded to the external storage media, and then the device 
was powered off powered into recovery mode where the update package was installed.  
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The device was powered back on and analyzed for correct execution of the update 
package.  For the execution to be considered a successful execution of the update 
package, the following criteria must be met: 
· The application creating the bitstream image must open upon and begin imaging 
upon boot 
· A bitstream image of the userdata partition must be on the external storage media 
· The bistream image must be of the correct size for the device 
· The bitstream image must contain a valid file system with no corruptions 
· Astro File Browser app and the Holy Bible app must be in the bitstream image 
· The web browsing history must contain the websites www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and www.nfl.com 
The Nexus One's userdata partition is formatted as YAFFS2 and required the 
unyaffs2 tool to extract the file system (Penguin.lin, 2012).  The current version was used, 
which was released in August 2012 and was downloaded from Google Code.  The other 
two devices' userdata partitions are formatted ext4 and were examined in FTK Imager 
version 3.1.1. 
If all of these conditions were correct upon execution of the update package, then the 
update was executed successfully.  If any other result were found, the update was not 
executed successfully, and any anomalies were noted. 
3.4.3.2 Limited Extraction of Data 
Before executing the update package to extract a limited set of data, or the web 
history, the device must first be in a known state.  The device was reset to a factory state, 
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and the web browser browsed to the websites www.att.com, www.sprint.com, 
www.verizon.com, and www.t-mobile.com. 
The update package was loaded to the external storage media, and then the device 
was powered off powered into recovery mode where the update package was installed.  
The device was powered back on and analyzed for correct execution of the update 
package. 
If the package was executed successfully, the following criteria must be met: 
· A CSV file must be on the device’s external storage media containing the web 
browsing history 
· The web browsing history must include the websites www.att.com, 
www.sprint.com, www.verizon.com, and www.t-mobile.com 
If these criteria were met, the package was executed successfully; if any other results 
occurred, the update was not executed successfully, and any anomalies were be noted. 
3.4.3.3 Evidence Planting 
Before executing the update package to extract a limited set of data, or the web 
history, the device must first be in a known state.  The device was reset to a factory state, 
and the web browser browsed to the websites from the first test.  The web history file 
from the bistream image from the first test for each device was extracted and stored for 
this update package; if the first test was not executed successfully, this file could be 
retrieved in a different fashion.  This file was modified to include three extra items in the 
web browsing history to fake the browser navigating to these pages.  These three extra 
webpages were www.bengals.com, www.microsoft.com, and www.walmart.com. 
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The update package was loaded to the device's external storage, and then the 
device was powered off and powered into recovery mode where the update package was 
installed.  The device was powered back on and analyzed for correct execution of the 
update package. 
If the update package was executed successfully, the following criteria must be met: 
· The device’s browser history must include the pages www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and www.nfl.com, as entered for the first update package 
· The device’s browser history must also include the websites www.bengals.com, 
www.microsoft.com, and www.walmart.com 
· The browser must open and execute properly 
If these criteria were met, the package was executed successfully; if any of these 
criteria were not met, the update package was not executed successfully. 
3.4.3.4 Malware Installation 
Before executing the update package to load some malware onto the device, the 
device must be in a known state.  The device was reset to factory state and the app Astro 
File Browser was installed on the device.  This app is a file browser; it allowed the 
researcher to see if the file successfully downloaded and its size. 
A 32 megabyte file called “spaceWaster.txt” was loaded onto a local web server.  The 
MD5 hash of this file was noted.  The application representing malware in this update 
package downloaded this file via http.  The update package was loaded to the device's 
external storage.  The device was powered off, booted into recovery mode, and the 
update package was installed.  The device was powered back on and analyzed for correct 
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execution of the update package. If the package was executed successfully, the following 
criteria must be met: 
· The file “spaceWaster.txt” must be on the device’s external storage 
· “spaceWaster.txt” must be 32 megabytes 
· The MD5 hash of “spaceWaster.txt” must match the original 
If these criteria were met perfectly then this update package was successfully 
executed; if any other results were found, this update was not executed successfully. 
3.4.4 Analysis 
When completed, sixty tests have been executed, each yielding results of 
“successful” or “not successful” with an explanation.  These results consist of five 
repetitions each of four update packages on three devices.  These results were stored in 
table form.  A table was made for each execution, or 60 total such tables.  Another table 
was made for each set of five repetitions of an update package executing on a specific 
device.  This results in 12 such tables.  Trends in the data in terms of success on specific 
devices and success on specific update packages was noted. 
Also, a discussion of soundness of the update package is in the final chapter.  This 
consists of the size of the update package, the files added to the device and their sizes, 
what all files were modified or created as a result of execution of the update package, and 
any other considerations worth noting.  For the first two update packages, forensic 
soundness is an essential consideration.  For the final two update packages, an effective 





CHAPTER 4. FINDINGS 
This study was a proof of concept study.  The forensic related update packages were 
not intended to be analyzed as tools to soon use in the field, and the malicious update 
packages were not intended to represent projected future malware.  This was a study in 
the effectiveness of update packages as a method of deploying utilities to a device. 
The research methodology detailed in Chapter 3 was executed, and the results of the tests 
discussed in the methodology are organized in 12 tables, which summarize the 60 total 
executions as described in Chapter 3.  The complete data for each of the 60 executions is 
in the appendix. 
In all sets of five repetitions of one update package on one device, either a set of 
five failures or a set of five successes was noted.  The Nexus One succeeded in all 
executions of all four update packages.  The Nexus S and the Xoom both successfully 
executed Update package 2, or the limited extraction update package, but every other 
update package was noted as an unsuccessful execution.  The overall success rate was 
50%. 
4.1 Forensic Image of the Device 
The first update package, a forensic image of the device, was attempted five times 
each on the three different devices, an HTC Nexus One running the Gingerbread build of 
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Android, a Samsung Nexus S running the Ice Cream Sandwich build of Android, and a 
Motorola Xoom running the Jelly Bean build of Android.  The following three tables 
contain the results of the five tests on these three devices and are each followed by 
detailed explanations of the data.  Only the Nexus One successfully executed this update 
package.  The observations of both successfully met and failed requirements are in the 
details in the following sections. 
Table 4.1 Results for Update Package 1 on Nexus One 
 Results (Success or Fail)  Notes 
Execution 1 Success  Image created successfully, 
both apps present, web history 
present 
Execution 2 Success Same as 1 above 
Execution 3 Success Same as 1 above 
Execution 4 Success Same as 1 above 
Execution 5 Success Same as 1 above 
 
For each execution of this update package, the device was set to a factory state, 
populated with a specific set of data, and rebooted into recovery mode where the 
researcher applied the update package.  In all five cases the update package was installed 
with no errors.  The Nexus One was then rebooted and the observations were compared 
to the criteria for success established in Chapter 3. 
Upon reboot, the imaging app opened up and began creating the image and 
storing it to the external storage card.  The first requirement was satisfied.  The image 
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was finished after a few minutes and was stored entirely on the storage card, which 
satisfied the second requirement.  The image was of size 196.2 Megabytes.  The device 
reported its size as 196 Megabytes in the application management menu in settings, and 
this number was rounded to the nearest Megabyte.  This satisfies the third requirement. 
The researcher attempted to use the unyaffs tool and many other freely available 
tools to browse the image of the device.  It was formatted yaffs2, which does not 
currently have support in FTK Imager.  According to Quick and Alzaabi (2011), a 
bitstream image of a yaffs2 partition, such as on Android,“cannot be realistically used to 
retrieve files.”  This presented a difficulty in satisfying this requirement.  The researcher 
was unable to extract files from the image but was able to search through the image using 
methods presented in Lessard and Kessler (2010).  The researcher could not absolutely 
confirm that the image had no corruptions, but there has been no evidence to suggest 
contrary.  The researcher realized after reviewing Quick and Alzaabi (2011), which was 
after collecting data, that a better tool would have both collected the bitstream image that 
was collected and also a NANDump, as described in that paper.  This tool would have 
provided an easier method of exploring the extracted files, though it would not be a 
bitstream image and thus would not include all slack space.  Obtaining both would be the 
proper step if these tools are to be edited in the future. 
The researcher used methods presented in Lessard and Kessler (2010) to manually 
search through the image.  The researcher extracted fragments of the application files and 
pieced the files together.  This is an extremely time consuming process.  The application 
files, Astro File Browser and the Holy Bible, are 2.3 Megabytes and 6.7 Megabytes 
respectively.  These files were fragmented in the image into sections ranging from four 
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kilobytes to 76 kilobytes.  This made piecing the files together extremely time consuming.  
The researcher successfully pieced together the Astro File Browser app in the first image.  
The researcher pieced together the beginning and the end of the app install files in all five 
images.  This does not absolutely confirm the files existed in the image, but the 
researcher has been given no indication to believe this not to be the case.  The researcher 
considers this requirement satisfied on all five repetitions. 
The same manual process was used to find web browsing history.  Evidence of 
browsing to www.purdue.edu, www.nfl.com, and developer.android.com were found in 
all five images.  The following image is an example of this evidence, pulled from a Hex 
editor, similar to the process in Lessard and Kessler (2010). 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Web History in Bitstream Image of Nexus One 
 
The above image shows two of the URLs within the image file viewable in a Hex 
editor, and similar evidence can be found for the third URL, www.nfl.com.  Such 
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evidence was found in all five images.  The researcher considers this requirement to also 
be satisfied. 
All six requirements were satisfied in all five executions.  The researcher was 
unable to find a tool to work properly with the image that was created in order to extract 
the file system.  If such a tool were available this would have been far simpler and less 
time consuming to complete.  Such a tool was not available, so the method of parsing 
through the bitstream image with a hex editor presented in Kessler and Lessard (2010) 
was used.  A future version of the tool for other YAFFS2 devices should incorporate the 
NANDump tool as presented in Quick and Alzaabi (2011). 
Table 4.2 Results for Update Package 1 on Nexus S 
 Results (Success or Fail) Notes 
Execution 1 Fail Imaging application did not 
start automatically. Upon 
manually opening the 
application and then restarting 
the device the application 
opened automatically and 
successfully created the 
image. 
Execution 2 Fail Same as 1 above 
Execution 3 Fail Same as 1 above 
Execution 4 Fail Same as 1 above 




The device was rebooted after the update package installed with no errors.  The 
imaging app did not start automatically.  The researcher manually opened up the imaging 
app.  Upon subsequent reboots, the imaging app opened automatically.  It required being 
manually launched first to open automatically.  This first requirement was recorded as a 
failure. 
The imaging app created an image of the userdata partition on the device’s 
external storage partition.  This satisfies the second requirement.  The image created was 
one Gigabyte, which is a match to the device’s actual userdata partition size.  This 
satisfies the third requirement. 
The image was successfully loaded into FTK Imager, which identified the image 
as being formatted ext4.  This satisfies the fourth requirement.  The file system contained 
the Astro File Browser app and the Holy Bible app, which satisfies the fifth requirement.  
The following screenshot shows these two files in an image from the Nexus S.  The 
directory open in the screenshot is /data/app, where installed application install files are 
stored. 
 
Figure 4.2 Apps Directory in Bitstream Image of Nexus S 
 
The file su.apk is a component of rooting the device, which was part of the update 
package.  The file imageUserdataNexusS.apk was the application file designed to image 
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the device, and the other two files were part of populating the device.  An interesting 
observation is the time stamp.  The modified data of the two apps that were added as part 
of populating the device reflect when the apps were installed on the device.  The other 
two apps were part of the update package and were installed via recovery mode.  The 
time stamp for both as viewed in FTK Imager is 8/1/2008 at noon. 
The web browsing history was intact in the image and contained the three 
required websites, which satisfies the final requirement.  The file where web browsing 
data was stored was /data/data/com.android.browser/databases/browser2.db and can be 
viewed in a SQLite3 viewer. 
The only failure noted was in the app launching automatically upon boot.  It failed 
to do so, and thus the execution was labeled a failure.  These observations occurred in all 
five executions of the first update package on the Nexus S. 
Table 4.3 Results for Update Package 1 on Xoom 
 Results (Success or Fail) Notes 
Execution 1 Fail Device could not detect SD 
card; Could not create an 
image 
Execution 2 Fail Same as 1 above 
Execution 3 Fail Same as 1 above 
Execution 4 Fail Same as 1 above 




The imaging app did not automatically launch upon boot, similarly to the 
behaviors of the Nexus S version of this update package.  If the app were to be manually 
opened, it would automatically launch on subsequent boots, also similarly to the 
behaviors of the Nexus S version of this package.  The first requirement was not 
successfully met. 
The device could not identify the external storage media, which was an SD card.  
The researcher mounted a USB flash drive to the device, but this also was not recognized.  
The build of Android may have been corrupted, or perhaps the hardware itself was 
damaged.  In either case, requirement number two could not be satisfied.  All subsequent 
requirements depend upon this requirement being satisfied, so no requirements were met 
and the execution was recorded as a failure.  These behaviors were observed in all five 
executions of this update package on the Xoom. 
The researcher did create a bitstream image of the device via ADB passed the 
image directly from the device to the computer; this was performed manually.  The web 
history file necessary for Update Package 3 was extracted from this manually created 
image.  This image contained the proper apps and web history. 
The cause for the device not recognizing external storage is not entirely known.  
Either the device could be physically damaged or the build the researcher created for this 
study could be corrupted.  In either case, the execution was unsuccessful, both for this 
failure and for the app not launching automatically upon boot. 
4.2 Limited Extraction of Data 
The second update package, an extraction of web history using the developer API, 
was attempted five times each on the three devices, just as with the previous update 
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package.  The following three tables contain the results of the five tests on these three 
devices and are each followed by detailed explanations of the data.  All three devices 
successfully executed this update package.  Details regarding these successful executions 
are in the following sections. 
Table 4.4 Results for Update Package 2 on Nexus One 
 Results (Success or Fail) Notes 
Execution 1 Success Displayed multiple entries for 
each of the four websites; 
perhaps because two were 
redirected to mobile version 
of the site, and mistyped 
some if not all of them; pages 
designated as “favorites” by 
Android also were in here 
Execution 2 Success Displayed multiple entries for 
only two, these two redirected 
to mobile version of the site.  
No mistypes.  Again had 
favorites. 
Execution 3 Success Same as 2 above 
Execution 4 Success Some extraneous entries due 
to mistypes 




In all five executions, a CSV file was created and stored on the device’s storage 
card following execution.  This satisfies the first requirement.  In all five cases, this CSV 
file contained the web history of the device which included all of the required websites.  
The website www.att.com was redirected to www.m.att.com, a mobile version of the 
website, and both of these appeared in all five files.  The websites www.t-mobile.com 
and www.m.t-mobile.com both appeared for the same reason.  The history also included 
pages pre-selected as favorites, including CNN, Yahoo, ESPN, and others.  In some cases, 
extra entries were included when the researcher mistyped a page on the device’s 
touchscreen.  The errors in typing and the redirection to the mobile versions of websites 
are not reasons to consider the second requirement a failure.  The Nexus One succeeded 
in all five repetitions. 
Table 4.5 Results for Update Package 2 on Nexus S 
 Results (Success or Fail) Notes 
Execution 1 Success Displayed multiple entries for 
some of the websites, perhaps 
because of redirection to 
mobile site 
Execution 2 Success Same as 1 above 
Execution 3 Success Same as 1 above 
Execution 4 Success Same as 1 above 




All five executions of this update package succeeded as both requirements were 
met. The file was stored on the device’s /sdcard partition, which is an internal partition of 
storage that acts like removable media.  There were redirections to the mobile version of 
websites similarly to the Nexus One previously, but there were no mistypes on the Nexus 
S. 
Table 4.6 Results for Update Package 2 on Xoom 
 Results (Success or Fail) Notes 
Execution 1 Success Exactly as specified, no repeat 
websites 
Execution 2 Success Same as 1 above 
Execution 3 Success Same as 1 above 
Execution 4 Success Same as 1 above 
Execution 5 Success Same as 1 above 
 
In all five executions, a CSV file was created and stored in a directory used for 
external storage.  This satisfies the first requirement.  The researcher did not type any 
websites incorrectly.  The Xoom did not redirect to the mobile versions of any websites 
so this CVS file did not contain any duplicate entries.  All five executions were 
considered successes. 
4.3 Evidence Planting 
The third update package, a malicious package which plants websites in history 
which the user did not visit, was attempted five times each on the three devices.  The 
following three tables contain the results of the five tests on these three devices and are 
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followed with further information about the data.  The Nexus One was the only device to 
successfully execute this update package.  The Nexus S and the Xoom both failed, though 
different observations were noted for each during these executions. 
Table 4.7 Results for Update Package 3 on Nexus One 
 Results (Success or Fail) Notes 
Execution 1 Success All three inserted web pages 
appear in browsing history 
Execution 2 Success Same as 1 above 
Execution 3 Success Same as 1 above 
Execution 4 Success Same as 1 above 
Execution 5 Success Same as 1 above 
 
The first requirement includes websites which were populated before the update 
was applied.  These three appeared in the device’s web browsing history upon rebooting, 
which means the first requirement was successfully met on the Nexus One.  The second 
requirement contains websites which were to be added as a result of applying the update 
package.  These three websites also appeared in web browsing history, even though the 
device did not actually navigate to these websites.  The second requirement was 
successfully met.  The web browser opened properly without crashes and reported web 
history properly, which satisfies the third requirement.  These behaviors were observed in 
all five executions, so all five executions on the Nexus One were successes. 
As stated in update package 1, extracting individual files from the Nexus One 
image was unrealistic.  The web history file was obtained from the device after update 
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package 1 was executed by using the Android Debug Bridge.  The device was rooted, so 
with root access via the Android Debug Bridge the file was obtained and modified for 
this update package. 
Table 4.8 Results for Update Package 3 on Nexus S 
 Results (Success or Fail) Notes 
Execution 1 Fail Browser crashed and history 
was cleared 
Execution 2 Fail Same as 1 above 
Execution 3 Fail Same as 1 above 
Execution 4 Fail Same as 1 above 
Execution 5 Fail Same as 1 above 
 
Upon reboot, the researcher opened the web browser to see if all six required web 
pages were in web history.  In all five executions, the browser app crashed upon opening.  
It was opened again and all history was gone.  This behavior means all three requirements 




Table 4.9 Results for Update Package 3 on Xoom 
 Results (Success or Fail) Notes 
Execution 1 Fail No change, history remained 
intact, browser did not crash 
Execution 2 Fail Same as 1 above 
Execution 3 Fail Same as 1 above 
Execution 4 Fail Same as 1 above 
Execution 5 Fail Same as 1 above 
 
Upon reboot after applying the update package, the researcher opened the web 
browser to see if all six required web pages were in history.  The web browsing app 
opened properly.  The original three webpages of the first requirement were in history, so 
this requirement was satisfied.  The webpages in the second requirement, which were 
planted in the update package, were not in web browsing history, so the second 
requirement was not successfully met.  The browser opened properly with no crashes, so 
the third requirement was met.  In all five executions, the Xoom did not successfully 
execute the update package since the planted web pages did not appear in history. 
4.4 Malware Installation 
The final update package, a malicious package which installs a malicious app that 
downloads a file to the device without the user's permission, was attempted five times 
each on the three devices.  The following three tables contain the results of the five tests 
on these three devices and are each followed with further information regarding the 
results.  The Nexus One successfully executed all five repetitions.  The Nexus S and the 
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Xoom both failed all five of their respective repetitions.  Details regarding the successes 
of the Nexus One repetitions and the failures of the other two devices are in the following 
sections. 
Table 4.10 Results for Update Package 4 on Nexus One 
 Results (Success or Fail) Notes 
Execution 1 Success Hash of downloaded file:  
279e4d151bcf4cbd9e2aab738b230aa7 
Execution 2 Success Same hash as 1 above 
Execution 3 Success Same hash as 1 above 
Execution 4 Success Same hash as 1 above 
Execution 5 Success Same hash as 1 above 
 
The file “spaceWaster.txt” was loaded onto a local webserver.  The MD5 hash of 
this file was 279e4d151bcf4cbd9e2aab738b230aa7.  This file was downloaded to the 
device’s storage card and was of size 32 megabytes.  The first two requirements were 
successfully met by these behaviors.  The MD5 hash of the downloaded file was an exact 
match to that on the web server, which satisfies the third requirement.  These behaviors 




Table 4.11 Results for Update Package 4 on Nexus S 
 Results (Success or Fail) Notes 
Execution 1 Fail App was successfully 
installed but immediately 
crashed upon opening 
Execution 2 Fail Same as 1 above 
Execution 3 Fail Same as 1 above 
Execution 4 Fail Same as 1 above 
Execution 5 Fail Same as 1 above 
 
The app was on the device upon reboot.  It was launched but it immediately 
crashed.  It did not download any file.  This behaviors means the Nexus S failed on all 
three requirements and this happened in all five executions. 
Table 4.12 Results for Update Package 4 on Xoom 
 Results (Success or Fail) Notes 
Execution 1 Fail App was successfully installed 
but immediately crashed upon 
opening 
Execution 2 Fail Same as 1 above 
Execution 3 Fail Same as 1 above 
Execution 4 Fail Same as 1 above 




The behaviors noted in the Nexus S were repeated on the Xoom.  None of the three 
requirements for success were met in any of the five repetitions.  All five executions were 
noted as unsuccessful. 
4.5 Summary of Results 
Of the 60 tests performed, 30 tests resulted successfully, or an even 50% success 
rate.  Five repetitions were performed each on 12 tests, and each set of five repetitions 
yielded identical results, meaning these results demonstrated remarkable consistency.  
Either the test was performed successfully or it failed, and it worked that way each and 
every time for the same tests on the same device running the same version of the Android 
operating system.  The following tables contain the data organized by update package. 
 
Table 4.13 Results for Update Package 1 across all devices 
 Successes (out of five 
repetitions) 
Success percentage 
Nexus One (Gingerbread) 5 100 
Nexus S (Ice Cream 
Sandwich) 
0 0 
Xoom (Jelly Bean) 0 0 
 
Update package 1, or imaging the device, worked as designed on the Nexus One 
for all repetitions.  The Nexus S failed as the app did not launch at boot.  The implication 
for this is important.  If a device is password locked and an investigator wishes to obtain 
a bitstream image of the device, one potential method would be to install an app to image 
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the device via recovery mode.  If the device is password locked, the investigator would 
be unable to manually open the app.  The app did not launch automatically and in the 
case of the locked phone, the investigator would have no way of getting the app to launch 
and therefore no way to create the bitstream image using this update package. 
The Xoom failed all five repetitions for both the same reason as the Nexus S and also to a 
technical issue.  The device was unable to locate an external storage card and thus had no 
ability to save an image to an external storage card. 
Table 4.14 Results for Update Package 2 across all devices 
 Successes (out of five 
repetitions) 
Success percentage 
Nexus One (Gingerbread) 5 100 
Nexus S (Ice Cream 
Sandwich) 
5 100 
Xoom (Jelly Bean) 5 100 
 
Update package 2, or extraction of web history, worked successfully on all 





Table 4.15 Results for Update Package 3 across all devices 
 Successes (out of five 
repetitions) 
Success percentage 
Nexus One (Gingerbread) 5 100 
Nexus S (Ice Cream 
Sandwich) 
0 0 
Xoom (Jelly Bean) 0 0 
 
Update package 3, or evidence planting, worked successfully on the Nexus One.  
The other two devices both failed but in different ways.  The Nexus S web browser 
crashed upon reboot after installing the update and all web history was purged.  The 
Xoom web browser retained the original populated web browsing history and did not 
crash upon boot but did not have the planted web browsing history. 
Table 4.16 Results for Update Package 4 across all devices 
 Successes (out of five 
repetitions) 
Success percentage 
Nexus One (Gingerbread) 5 100 
Nexus S (Ice Cream 
Sandwich) 
0 0 
Xoom (Jelly Bean) 0 0 
 
The Nexus One successfully executed Update package 4, or malware installation.  
The Nexus S and the Xoom both failed in the same way.  The malware app crashed as 
soon as it was opened on both devices. 
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Update package 2 was the only one that succeeded on all three devices.  Update 
package 4 failed on the Nexus S and the Xoom in identical fashions, Update package 3 
failed on the Nexus S and the Xoom in different fashions, and Update package 1 failed on 
the Xoom for the same reason as it failed on the Nexus S but also had an additional 
technical issue. 
The following three tables display the same data but organized by device. 
Table 4.17 Results for Update Packages on Nexus One 
 Successes (out of five 
repetitions) 
Success percentage 
Update Package 1 5 100 
Update Package 2 5 100 
Update Package 3 5 100 
Update Package 4 5 100 
 
The Nexus One succeeded in all update packages.  This device ran Gingerbread, 
or the oldest version of Android represented.  All update packages were successfully 
installed in recovery mode.  Update packages 1, 2, and 4 involved installing an app and in 




Table 4.18 Results for Update Packages on Nexus S 
 Successes (out of five 
repetitions) 
Success percentage 
Update Package 1 0 0 
Update Package 2 5 100 
Update Package 3 0 0 
Update Package 4 0 0 
 
The Nexus S failed all update packages expect for the second one, representing a 
limited extraction of data.  This update package leveraged the device’s API to output web 
history.  This process is documented on the Android development website (Android, 
2013, Browser).  The other update packages were different in that they relied on methods 
not preferred on the Android development website, including “hacks,” for success. 
Update package 1 relied upon rooting the device, which is considered by the hacking 
community to be a hack (Lessard & Kessler, 2010), and executing a shell command using 
the “dd” utility. 
Update package 3 relied upon overwriting in recovery mode a database which the 
browser app uses.  This is opposite of Update package 2, which relied upon the device’s 
API to access web history and, as previously stated, is documented on the Android 
development website. 
Update package 4 relied upon downloading a file in the background without the 
user’s permission or knowledge.  This did not leverage the device’s browser.  The 
standard method of downloading files in Android is to use the DownloadManager utility 
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(Android, 2013, DownloadManager), but this notifies the user of a download.  A non-
preferred method of downloading was used, so this update package, along with the first 
and third, used methods which are not documented as preferred methods on the Android 
development website. 
Table 4.19 Results for Update Packages on Xoom 
 Successes (out of five 
repetitions) 
Success percentage 
Update Package 1 0 0 
Update Package 2 5 100 
Update Package 3 0 0 
Update Package 4 0 0 
 
The Xoom, like the Nexus S, failed on all four update packages with the exception 
of Update Package 2.  The previous section discussed how update packages 1, 3, and 4 
used non-preferred methods to achieve success, including some hacks.  The same is true 
to these update packages.  The Xoom’s only successful update package was Update 
package 2, like the Nexus S, which is the only update package to rely on documented 
methods on the Android development website to successfully execute. 
4.6 Size of the Apps 
All of the update packages, expect for the one which plants data, involve installing 
an app.  The size of this app needs to be known to understand how much of an impact is 
made on the device by applying these packages.  The following table contains the sizes of 
all of these apps. 
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Table 4.20 Sizes of Apps in Update Packages 
Device Update Package App Size (kB) 
Nexus One 1 (Image Device) 155.7 
Nexus S 1 (Image Device) 155.9 
Xoom 1 (Image Device) 155.9 
Nexus One 2 (Limited Extraction) 155.7 
Nexus S 2 (Limited Extraction) 155.7 
Xoom 2 (Limited Extraction) 155.7 
Nexus One 4 (Malware Installation) 156.5 
Nexus S 4 (Malware Installation) 156.5 
Xoom 4 (Malware Installation) 156.5 
 
All of these apps are small and have a small footprint when compared to other 
apps on the Play Store.  ABI Research studied the size of both iOS and Android apps in 
2012.  The study stated the average app size for Android was around six megabytes as of 
September 2012, and this represented a 10% increase since March 2012 (ABI Research, 
2012).  The apps designed for this thesis are all very simple, use no graphics, and were 
designed to have as small a footprint as possible.  Also of note is that the first update 
packages required rooting the device.  The su binary, placed in the system partition, is 
371 KB, and the su app, which was downloaded from the Android Market, is 1.4 MB.  
These files needed to be placed on the device for this update to work, and they can both 
also be uninstalled easily with another update package.  A previous section suggested that 
the Nexus One version of update package 1 should be revised to include the NANDump 
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tool, so this would also have be to packaged in future releases and considered in a 
soundness discussion. 
The first update package changed the device since it installed the app designed for to 
create a bitstream image of the device, the su app, and the su binary.  The second update 
package installed the app designed to extract web history, but no other files were changed.  
The third update package modified the web browsing file by adding some extra entries.  
The fourth update package installed the app designed to represent malware and attempted 
to download the spaceWaster.txt file.  Beyond these described changes and any system 
logs which were created as a result of running this update packages, no other files were 





CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Many of the update packages failed, and when an update package for a device failed 
once, it failed in all five executions in the exact same way.  The Nexus One was the only 
device to have complete success.  The other two failed in all but one test.  The key 
difference between the successes of the Nexus One and the two other devices, the Nexus 
S and the Xoom, is the operating system.  The Nexus One runs the oldest version of the 
Android operating system. 
This proof of concept study aimed to determine if update packages could be used in a 
forensic or a malicious method on Android devices.  The results of this study do not 
indicate that these tools are ready to be used.  More research into the differences between 
versions of the Android operating system and differences between data storage of 
different versions of common apps is required to move this research forward.  In all 60 
executions in this research, the update was installed in recovery mode with no errors, but 
the criteria for success as defined in Chapter 3 were only met 50% of the time. 
This chapter focuses on analyzing the data presented in the previous chapter.  Trends 
are discussed, along with an analysis of the differing results from one device to the next.  




5.1 Answering the Research Question 
Chapter 1 proposed the following research question:  can update packages be used 
to deliver malicious payloads and/or utilities beneficial for a forensic investigation on 
current Android devices?  The answer is no after viewing the results and their context.  
Three of the four update packages tested relied on some hacks and these have been 
stopped by the security mechanisms of the newer operating systems.  With some further 
research into these security mechanisms and different versions of key common apps, such 
as the web browser, these update packages could be revised and retested for success. 
5.2 Explanations of Different Results for the Devices 
As discussed in the previous chapter, there are some trends in this data.  The Nexus 
One successfully executed all update packages.  The Nexus S and the Xoom, which ran 
newer versions of the operating system than the build of Android on the Nexus One, 
succeeded only on update package 2.  The other three update packages relied on hacks, as 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
In all executions, the update package was installed in recovery mode with no errors.  
In no case did the recovery mode reject an update package.  In all cases are an app was 
installed on the device as a result of the update package, the app appeared in the device’s 
app list upon reboot. 
The consistency within each set of update packages on a device was notable.  In all 
12 sets of a specific update package on a specific device, all five repetitions either 
succeeded or failed in the same way.   The devices were all populated to a known set of 
data.  In each case where websites were visited, the same set of websites was visited each 
time.  When apps were installed, the same set of apps were installed each time.  The 
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conditions for each set of five repetitions of one update package on one device were as 
identical as possible.  This remove any variables which might have led to differing results 
within each set of an update package and a device.  The results were same for each set of 
five repetitions, so these update packages execute consistently.  If these packages are to 
be improved and eventually used as forensic tools, this consistency satisfies a Daubert 
requirement.  One of the Daubert criteria for admissibility of scientific evidence is the 
reliability of the forensic process (Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy, 
2003). 
The Nexus One successfully executed all four update packages, but the Nexus S 
and the Xoom failed the same three update packages.  There are two potential variables 
that exist to cause this difference.  The Nexus One could have hardware that is better 
suited for these update packages, or the newer versions of the operating system could 
contain features to prevent these update packages from executing properly. 
The first possibility is the Nexus One device itself is the cause for better execution 
of update packages.  The Nexus S and the Xoom both contain some hardware upgrades 
from the Nexus One, and all three are created by different manufacturers.  The other 
possibility of the difference of results between the Nexus One and the other two devices 
is the operating system difference.  The Nexus One ran Gingerbread, or Android 2.3, 
while the newer two ran Ice Cream Sandwich and Jellybean, or 4.0 and 4.1. 
The second possibility is more likely.  The update packages, with the exception of 
the evidence planting package, installed an app on the device.  These apps are designed 
not for a specific platform but for an Android version. 
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Another consideration is a study of known exploits for Android.  Some exploits are 
targeted at an application, such as a known Adobe Flash Player for Android exploit.  
According to Adobe, this exploit “could cause a crash and potentially allow an attacker to 
take control of the affected system” (Adobe, 2013).  Some exploits are targeted at a 
version of Android, and as newer versions of Android are released these vulnerabilities 
are addressed (Google, 2011).  And finally, there are some exploits that are targeted at a 
lower level of the device and can be an exploit against a specific device instead of a 
version of the operating system; such an example is a kernel exploit against the Samsung 
Galaxy S3 (Dawson, 2012). 
Device specific exploits tend to be lower level exploits, such as the aforementioned 
Galaxy S3 exploit.  The update packages used in this study were written as apps, except 
for the evidence planting package, and were delivered to the device via update packages.  
These did not attempt to write to device files or gain privilege escalation like the Galaxy 
S3 exploit (Dawson, 2012), except the first update package could only work if it rooted 
the device.  The device imaging app did work at a low level, but that only read from a 
device block instead of attempting to write to one; that read process required root access 
so the update package rooted the device for this purpose.  The fact that these apps work at 
a level above the kernel suggests that the explanation of device differences, instead of 
operating system differences, is an unlikely explanation for the results. 
Some exploits are targeted specifically at a certain version of the operating system 
as stated previously.  The upgrade from Gingerbread to Ice Cream Sandwich addressed 
some security issues, including some exploits for rooting devices.  Gingerbreak is an 
exploit to root the device which works on Gingerbread devices but does not work in Ice 
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Cream Sandwich devices (Xda Developers, 2011, April 21).  ZergRush is a similar 
exploit that works on Froyo, or Android 2.2, devices and Gingerbread devices but 
nothing newer (Xda Developers, 2011, October 10).  The Nexus One, which was the only 
device to successfully execute all update packages, ran Gingerbread.  The other two 
devices ran Ice Cream Sandwich and its successor, Jelly Bean.  The fact that security was 
improved at the operating system level from Gingerbread to newer versions suggests that 
the difference in results lies in the difference in operating systems.  Security mechanisms 
in the newer versions of the operating systems may have prevented some of the “hacks” 
in the update packages from working. 
It is also worthwhile to examine exactly what happened during these failures.  In 
the device imaging update package, the two devices that failed their executions were 
noted as failures because the app did not open automatically until the user explicitly 
opened the app.  The app installed successfully and was on the home screen but did not 
open.  This is certainly not a hardware related issue.  This is likely an operating system 
issue.  The Android operating system provides a framework for applications to run, along 
with libraries, a runtime environment, and process management (Android, n.d., App 
Framework).  A likely explanation is Ice Cream Sandwich and newer versions of the 
operating system updated the application framework to forbid an app from detecting the 
device booting and launching automatically until it has first been launched manually. 
A similar explanation can be used for the malware package.  This app crashed 
immediately upon opening.  This used an Android class called AsyncTask, which is a 
class involving thread handling (Android, 2013, AsyncTask).  Thread handling also is a 
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responsibility of the operating system since it provides process management (Android, 
n.d., App Framework). 
A likely explanation for the success of the Nexus One but the failures of the other 
two is that an improvement in the Android operating system in Ice Cream Sandwich and 
newer limited some of the tasks that AsyncTask can do.  A possibility is that when an 
AsyncTask attempted to download a file instead of using the included DownloadManager, 
the operating system shut down the app. 
The evidence planting update package is different from the other two.  This 
package updated a database file which contained web browsing history.  When the device 
was rebooted, the web browser application, instead of the rest of the operating system, 
reacted.  The reactions were different in the two failed versions.  The web browser on the 
Nexus S crashed and deleted all web browsing history; the web browser on the Xoom 
opened but had no visible changes in web browsing history.  The web browser, like 
Android, has multiple versions.  The web browser in the Nexus One was version 2.3.1. 
The browser on the Nexus S was version 4.0.4, and the version on the Xoom was 4.1.1.  
The cause for the difference in reactions of this update package was the web browser 
version on the device.  The different versions may store data differently and the update 
packages must be revised from one web browser version to the next. 
The cause for the differing results from one device to the next is most likely not a 
hardware issue.  The most likely cause of differing results is the difference in versions of 
the operating system, or in the evidence planting package, difference in versions of the 
web browser app.  Newer versions of the Android operating system present new security 
features which limit the functionality of the update packages.  Update packages 1, 3, and 
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4 relied upon hacks.  These hacks were allowed to execute on the Nexus One running 
Gingerbread, but the newer operating systems and the newer web browsers on the other 
two devices prevented some of this functionality from working.  It is possible that these 
apps can be revised to work on the newer versions of the operating system.  It is also 
possible that some functionality, including the ability to launch an app automatically 
without first manually opening the app, is not possible in the newer version of the 
operating system and the requirements for these packages must be revised. 
5.3 Results in Context 
Some explanations are required for these results to keep the results in proper 
context.  This includes some limitations which must be considered when viewing the 
results.  First, the researcher signed these update packages and deployed them to devices 
running versions of the operating system which the researcher built.  As stated in 
previous chapters, the researcher acted as an OEM.  For these packages to work, the 
vendors must cooperate.  The vendors maintain keys used to sign official packages, and 
they are certainly capable of cooperating with vendors of forensic tools to sign packages 
used for a forensic purpose.  If the signing keys are not provided, the proper keys must be 
derived to create update packages for Android devices.  Deriving the keys would take 
reverse engineering a known update package for a specific device using cryptology with 
the intent of extracting a private key from the files CERT.RSA, CERT.SF, and 
MANIFEST.MF, as discussed in Chapter 2.  If the update package is not properly signed, 
the default Android recovery mode will reject it.   
Second, all of the failures in this thesis can be explained, further research can be 
applied to improve these results.  It must also be noted that the errors experienced were 
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not related to how the payloads themselves were pushed to the device.  If these tools are 
improved such that the device imaging app opens automatically upon boot and that 
capability is applied to other forensic update packages, these packages would be an 
improvement over current forensic tools for Android devices as these tools cannot bypass 
the device password.  Given the minimal impact of these updates, the consistency viewed 
in the results of executing these updates, and with improvement in the execution of these 
packages, the update packages, after improvements and validations, can be used in 
criminal investigations as long as the investigator documents all actions taken.  With this 
consideration applied to the malicious update packages, users with malicious intent can 
have a harmful tool with a small footprint. 
These results were viewed on devices which run Gingerbread, Ice Cream Sandwich, 
and Jelly Bean.  As of press time, the release date and name of the next version of 
Android is unknown, though the last two and a half years before press date have brought 
the three versions of Android tested and also Honeycomb (Ducrohet, 2010; Ducrohet, 
2011; Ghosh, 2012).  These update packages failed on newer version of the operating 
system while succeeding on the oldest one.  One can assume that devices running 
Gingerbread will become less common in future years as more devices with the newest 
versions of Android sell.  These update packages will need to be updated as new versions 
of the operating system release. 
5.4 Future Research 
Some future research has already been mentioned in discussion of failed update 
packages.  The NANDump tool should be researched for effectiveness as a supplement to 
update package 1 on the Nexus One.  The security mechanisms of Android which are 
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likely to have limited the functionality of these updates should be studied and this 
knowledge could lead to more effective forensic or malicious update packages.  More 
research into other similar topics can be performed.  This method is intended for Android 
devices.  Potential research could be performed if equivalent methods could be used on 
Windows Mobile devices.  The signed update packages rely upon an official signature.  
Research could be performed on reverse engineering these updates to obtain the original 
key used to sign the packages. 
5.5 Conclusions 
This proof of concept study presented a new technique of loading apps or making 
other changes to Android devices.  The actual method of putting the payload onto the 
device executed every time with no reported errors, though the payloads that were 
installed only succeeded 50% of the time. 
The Nexus One successfully executed all four update packages in all fix executions.  
Two of these update packages were of a forensic nature and the other two were of a 
malicious nature.  These update packages were signed and executed in recovery mode, 
and the results of these packages were observed as the device was normally booted.  
These update packages were ported to the Nexus S and the Xoom, and in both cases the 
only update package that was successfully executed was a limited extraction of web data. 
The newer versions of the Android operating system contained functionality that limited 
a forensic imaging update package and a malware package.  The newer version of the 
web browser similarly limited the functionality of an evidence planting update package.  
An alternative explanation was the Nexus One device itself was more prone to successful 
executions than the other two devices.  This alternative does not adequately explain the 
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differences in results when comparing these results in context of known exploits on 
Android devices. 
The researcher concluded that these update packages are not ready to be used as they 
are in their current state, and further development is required on these forensic and 
malicious update packages.  There is great potential for these update packages as eventual 
forensic tools, and with that comes potential for this concept to be used as a method of 
delivering malicious apps.  More research into security models and app data storage in 
the newer versions of the operating system is required to progress these packages beyond 









LIST OF REFERENCES 
ABI Research.  (2012, October 6).  Average size of mobile games of iOS increased by a 




Adobe.  (2013, January 8).  Security updates available for Adobe Flash Player.  Retrieved 
March 31, 2013 from http://www.adobe.com/support/security/bulletins/apsb13-
01.html 
 
Android.  (2012, July 12).  RecoverySystem.  Retrieved July 15, 2012 from 
http://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/RecoverySystem.html 
 
Android.  (2013, March 21).  AsynchTask.  Retrieved March 31, 2013 from  
http://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/AsyncTask.html 
 
Android.  (2013, March 21).  Browser.  Retrieved March 31, 2013 from  
http://developer.android.com/reference/android/provider/Browser.html 
 
Android.  (2013, March 21).  DownloadManager.  Retrieved March 31, 2013 from  
http://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/DownloadManager.html 
 
Android.  (n.d.).  App framework.  Retrieved March 31, 2013 from 
http://developer.android.com/about/versions/index.html 
 
Android.  (n.d.).  Building for devices.  Retrieved January 16, 2013 from 
http://source.android.com/source/building-devices.html 
 
Android.  (n.d.).  Downloading the source tree.  Retrieved February 1, 2013 from 
http://source.android.com/source/downloading.html 
 
Android.  (n.d.).  Get the Android SDK.  Retrieved February 1, 2013 from 
http://developer.android.com/sdk/index.html 
 





Android.  (n.d.).  Signing your applications.  Retrieved July 17, 2012 from 
http://developer.android.com/tools/publishing/app-signing.html 
 
Atomicdryad.  (2010, October).  Signapk.  Google Code project.  Retrived January 16, 
2013 from http://code.google.com/p/signapk/ 
 
Boneh, D.  (1999).  Twenty years of attacks on the RSA cryptosystem.  Notices of the 
 American Mathematical Society, 46(2), 203 – 213. 
 
Burnette, E.  (2010, August 3).  Android sales surge, surpass iPhone (updated).  Retrieved 
19 February, 2011 from http://www.zdnet.com/blog/burnette/android-sales-surge-
surpass-iphone-updated/2019 
 
Cellebrite Mobile Synchronization LTD.  (2011).  UFED Logical supported phones.  
Retrieved 20 February, 2011 from http://www.cellebrite.com/forensic-
products/ufed-standard-kit/ufed-logical-supported-phones.html 
 
ClockworkMod.  (n.d.).  ROM Manager.  Retrieved January 16, 2013 from 
http://www.clockworkmod.com/rommanager 
 
Commtouch.  (2013, February).  Internet Threats Trend Report, February 2013.  




Daniel, L. (Producer). (2009, September 27). Andrew Hoog of viaForensics talks about 
android forensics [Audio Podcast]. http://www.blogtalkradio.com/TalkForensics. 
 
Dawson, T.  (2012, December 17).  PSA: Samsung device owners of GS2, GS3, OG Note, 




Distefano, A., Me, Gianluigi., & Pace, F.  (2010).  Android anti-forensics through a local 
paradigm.  Digital Investigation, 7, 83-94. 
 
Ducrohet, X.  (2010, December 6).  Android 2.3 platform and updated SDK tools.  
Retrieved April 12, 2013 from http://android-
developers.blogspot.com/2010/12/android-23-platform-and-updated-sdk.html 
 
Ducrohet, X.  (2011, October 18).  Android 4.0 platform and updated SDK tools.  





Eadicicco, L.  (2012, December 4).  Android will remain most popular mobile platform 




Elgin, B.  (2005, August 16).  Google buys Android for its mobile arsenal.  Retrieved 11 
April 2013 from http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-08-16/google-buys-
android-for-its-mobile-arsenal 
 
F-Secure Labs.  (2012, November 5).  Mobile threat report Q3 2012.  Retrieved 15 
January, 2013 from http://www.f-secure.com/static/doc/labs_global/Research/ 
Mobile%20Threat%20Report%20Q3%202012.pdf 
 
Fingas, J.  (2012, June 27).  Google play hits 600,000 apps, 20 billion total installs.  
Retrieved January 15, 2013 from http://www.engadget.com/2012/06/27/ google-
play-hits-600000-apps/ 
 
Ghosh, A.  (2012, June 27).  Introducing Android 4.1 (jelly bean) preview platform, and 
more.  Retrieved April 12, 2013 from http://android-
developers.blogspot.com/2012/06/introducing-android-41-jelly-bean.html 
 
Google.  (2011, November 3).  Issue 21523: CVE-2011-1352: privilege escalation in  
PowerVR SGX drivers.  Retrieved March 31, 2013 from  
https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=21523 
 
Google.  (2012, November 29).  Binaries for Nexus devices.  Retrieved January 15, 2013 
from https://developers.google.com/android/nexus/drivers 
 
Greenberg, A.  (2012, May 15).  Antivirus firm:  75% of phone-based malware now 




HTC Corporation. (2008, September 23). T-Mobile unveils the T-Mobile G1 — the first 
phone powered by Android. Press Release. Retrieved December 1, 2009 from 
http://www.htc.com/www/press.aspx?id=66338&lang=1033 
 
Hoog, A. (2009, May 29). Android Forensics: Android forensics [PowerPoint slides]. 
Retrieved December 1, 2009 from http://viaforensics.com. 
 
Hoog, A.  (2011).  Android Forensics:  Investigation, Analysis, and Mobile Security for 





Imran, A.  (2012, July 20).  How to install / flash Android 4.1.1 jelly bean on Nexus S 




IndefactorX.  (8 December 2009).  "Re: Droid rooted ! update.zip to root your droid."   
Android Community.  http://androidcommunity.com/forums/f4/ droid-rooted-
update-zip-to-root-your-droid-29398/ 
 
International Data Corporation.  (2012, December 4).  Worldwide mobile phone growth 
expected to drop to 1.4% in 2012 despite continued growth of smartphones, 
according to IDC.  Press Release.  Retrieved 15 January 2013 from 
http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS23818212#.UPX_Uc9QB2O 
 
Kovacik, S., & O'Day, D.R.  (2010).  A proposed methodology for victim Android phone 




Lessard, J., & Kessler, G.C.  (2010).  Android forensics:  Simplifying cell phone 
examinations.  Small Scale Digital Device Forensics Journal, 4(1). 
 
Londatiga, L.  (2010, July 2).  How to create Android update zip package.  Retrieved July 
 15, 2012 from http://www.londatiga.net/it/how-to-create-android-update-
zip- package/ 
 
McGhee, R.  (2010, January 22).  Creating an Android update.zip package.  Retrieved 
January 16, 2013 from http://www.robmcghee.com/android/creating-an-android-
update-zip-package/ 
 
McKemmish, R.  (1999).  What is forensic computing?  Trends & Issues in Crime and 
Criminal Justice, 118. 
 
Micro Systemation AB.  (2011, February 18).  MSAB releases XRY 5.4.  Retrieved 20 
February 2011 from 
http://www.msab.com/support/news/archive/2011/february/page.php 
 
Mohindra, D. (2008). “The Android Project”: Incident Response. Retrieved February 18, 
2010 from http://www1.webng.com/dhruv/material/ android_report.pdf. 
 
Mooij, B.: (2010, September 29).  Data extraction from a physical dump.  Retrieved 





Naraine, R.  (2012, July 13).  Android malware's dirty secret: repackaging of legit apps.  
Retrieved July 15, 2012 from http://www.zdnet.com/android-malwares-dirty-
secret-repackaging-of-legit-apps-7000000886/ 
 
National Institute of Standards and Technology.  (2007, May).  Guidelines on cell phone 
forensics.  U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology.  Retrieved 12 February, 2011 from 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-101/SP800-101.pdf 
 
National Institute of Standards and Technology.  (2010).  Smart phone tool specification.  
Version 1.1.  U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology.  Retrieved 12 September, 2010 from 
http://www.cftt.nist.gov/documents/Smart_Phone_Tool_Specification.pdf 
 
Oxygen Software Company.  (2011).  Supported devices features matrix.  Retrieved 20 
February, 2011 from http://www.oxygen-forensic.com/en/models/ 
 
Paraben Corporation.  (2010).  Device Seizure supported models and plug-in details.  
Retrieved 20 February, 2011 from http://www.paraben.com/cell_models.html 
 
Penguin.lin.  (2012, August 15).  Yaffs2utils.  Google Code project.  Retrieved February 
1, 2013 from http://code.google.com/p/yaffs2utils/ 
 
Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy.  (2003).  Daubert:  The most 
influential Supreme Court ruling you've never heard of.  Boston, MA. 
 
Quick, D. & Alzaabi, M.  (2001).  Forensic analysis of the Android file system YAFFS2.  
Australian Digital Forensics Conference. 
 
Robinson, S.  (June 2003).  Still guarding secrets, RSA earns accolades for its founders.  
SIAM News, 36(5). 
 
Thompson, E.  (2005).  MD5 collisions and the impact on computer forensics.  Digital 
Investigation, 2, 36 – 40. 
 




ViaForensics.  (February 1, 2011).  ViaForensics' AFLogical tool is best for Android 






Weiss, T.R.  (2012, July 14).  Android cracks 50 percent as smartphone sales rise: 
Nielsen.  Retrieved 15 July 2012 from http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Mobile-And-
Wireless/Android-Cracks-50-Percent-as-Smartphone-Sales-Rise-Nielsen-862559/ 
 
Wilcox, J.  (2011, February 9).  Gartner: Android smartphone sales surged 888.8% in 




Xda Developers.  (2011, April 21).  GingerBreak APK (root for GingerBread).  Retrieved 
March 31, 2013 from http://forum.xda-
developers.com/showthread.php?t=1044765 
 
Xda Developers.  (2011, October 10).  Revolutionary - zergRush local root 2.2/2.3.  
Retrieved March 31, 2013 from http://forum.xda-
developers.com/showthread.php?t=1296916 
 
Xda Developers.  (n.d.).  ClockworkMod Recovery.  Retrieved January 16, 2013 from 
http://forum.xda-developers.com/wiki/ClockworkMod_Recovery 
 
Yang, H.  (2012).  Meta-inf files - digests, signature, and certificate.  Retrieved January 

















The apps used in this study were written using the Android Software Development Kit 
for the 2.3 version of Android.  Android apps are written in Java.  Snippets of code in the 
source for these apps appears in the following sections. 
 
Image Extraction Source Snippet 
Each of the three devices had a slightly different device block directory.  The method for 
creating a bitstream image was similar for each.  The following snippet is essential to the 
image creation process.  This snippet is generalized to work for any of the three devices.  
The path to the device block for the userdata partition for all three devices appears in this 
snippet.  The update package rooted the device, so the “su” command was available. 
// source: http://stackoverflow.com/questions/14566861/obtain-in-out-
streams-to-file-via-process-shell 
  // for Nexus One: 
  public static String USERDATA_LOC = "/dev/mtd/mtd5";  
  // for Nexus S: 
  public static String USERDATA_LOC = "/dev/block/platform/s3c-
sdhci.0/by-name/userdata"; 
  // For Xoom: 
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  public static String USERDATA_LOC = "/dev/block/platform/sdhci-
tegra.3/by-name/userdata";
  @Override 
  public void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) { 
    try 
    { 
      String sdcard = 
Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory().getAbsolutePath(); 
      Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec("su"); 
      DataOutputStream outs = new DataOutputStream(p.getOutputStream()); 
      String command = "cat " + USERDATA_LOC + " > " + sdcard + 
"/userdata.img"; 
      outs.writeBytes(command + "\n"); 
      Toast.makeText(this,  "Image Successfully created", 
Toast.LENGTH_LONG).show(); 
    } 
    catch (Exception ex) 
    { 
      Log.d("exception in shell", ex.getMessage()); 







Limited Extraction Source Snippet 
The following Java source is critical to the app which attempted a limited extraction of 
data from the device.  This app leveraged the Android API to extract web history from 
the device.  The history is saved to a file on the device’s external storage directory. 
// source:  http://stackoverflow.com/questions/2577084/android-read-
browser-history 
public class MainActivity extends Activity { 
  @Override 
  public void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState)  
  { 
    try 
    { 
      File sdcard = Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory();          
      File outFile = new File(sdcard, "webHistory.csv"); 
      FileOutputStream fOut = new FileOutputStream(outFile); 
      OutputStreamWriter myOutWriter = new OutputStreamWriter(fOut);          
      Cursor histCursor = this.managedQuery(Browser.BOOKMARKS_URI, 
Browser.HISTORY_PROJECTION, null, null, null); 
      Log.d("Cursor count", String.valueOf(histCursor.getCount())); 
      if (histCursor.moveToFirst() && histCursor.getCount() > 0) 
      { 
        myOutWriter.append("Title;URL;NumberOfVisits;LastVisitEpoch\n"); 
        while (histCursor.isAfterLast() == false) 
        { 





          myOutWriter.append(";"); 
          
myOutWriter.append(histCursor.getString(Browser.HISTORY_PROJECTION_URL_
INDEX)); 
          myOutWriter.append(";");           
myOutWriter.append(String.valueOf(histCursor.getInt(Browser.HISTORY_PRO
JECTION_VISITS_INDEX))); 
          myOutWriter.append(";");           
myOutWriter.append(histCursor.getString(Browser.HISTORY_PROJECTION_DATE
_INDEX)); 
          myOutWriter.append("\n"); 
          histCursor.moveToNext(); 
        } 
      } 
      myOutWriter.close(); 
      fOut.close(); 
    } 
    catch (Exception ex) 
    { 
      Log.d("Exception", ex.getMessage()); 
    } 








Malware Source Snippet 
The following Java source is critical to the app which represented malware.  This app 
attempted to download a large file from a local web server.  The URL of the web server 
was redacted for publication. 
// source: various pages on stackoverflow.com 
public class MainActivity extends Activity {  
  private static final String URLString = 
"http://[redacted]/android/spaceWaster.txt"; // URL of web server, 
redacted for publication 
  private static final String dest = "spaceWaster.txt"; 
  private static final int DOWNLOAD_BUFFER_SIZE = 4096; 
  @Override 
  public void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) 
  { 
    readWebpage(); 
  } 
  private class DownloadWebPageTask extends AsyncTask<String, Void, 
String> 
  { 
    @Override 
    protected String doInBackground(String... urls) 
    { 
      String downloadedText = ""; 
      for (String url : urls) 
      { 
        DefaultHttpClient client = new DefaultHttpClient(); 
        HttpGet httpGet = new HttpGet(url); 
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        HttpResponse execute; 
        try  
        { 
          execute = client.execute(httpGet); 
          InputStream content; 
          content = execute.getEntity().getContent(); 
          BufferedReader buffer = new BufferedReader(new 
InputStreamReader(content)); 
          String s = ""; 
          while ((s = buffer.readLine()) != null) 
          { 
            downloadedText += s; 
          } 
        } catch (IOException e) { 
          e.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
      } 
      return downloadedText; 
    } 
  } 
  public void readWebpage() 
  { 
    DownloadWebPageTask task = new DownloadWebPageTask(); 
    task.execute(new String[] {URLString}); 





Update Package Scripts 
The following sections are the contents of the file updater-script in each of the update 
packages.  This file is located at /META-INF/com/google/android within each update 
package.  In all of the packages, except for package 3, an app is installed.  The .apk file, 
or the application file, is placed in the directory /data/app on the device.  The .apk file is 
in the update package in the directory /data/app.  The packages on the Xoom where an 
app was installed required an extra step where the app was granted proper permissions.  
The other two devices did not require this step. 
 
Update Package 1 updater-script for Nexus One 
ui_print("Mounting data..."); 
mount("yaffs2", "MTD", "userdata", "/data"); 
ui_print("Mounting system..."); 
mount("yaffs2", "MTD", "system", "/system"); 









Update Package 1 updater-script for Nexus S 





ui_print("Mounting system ...."); 
mount("ext4", "EMMC", "/dev/block/platform/s3c-sdhci.0/by-name/system", 
"/system"); 
ui_print("Extracting data ...."); 
package_extract_dir("data", "/data"); 
ui_print("Extracting system ...."); 
package_extract_dir("system", "/system"); 
ui_print("Fixing permissions ...."); 
set_perm(0, 0, 06755, "/system/xbin/su"); 
ui_print("Unmounting user data ...."); 
unmount("/data"); 

















set_perm(0, 2000, 06755, "/system/xbin/su"); 
set_perm(0, 2000, 0644, "/data/app/su.apk"); 






Update Package 2 updater-script for Nexus One 
ui_print("Mounting data..."); 
mount("yaffs2", "MTD", "userdata", "/data"); 





















ui_print("Data mounted, now copying..."); 
package_extract_dir("data", "/data"); 
ui_print("Permissions ..."); 




Update Package 3 updater-script for Nexus One 
ui_print("Mounting data..."); 






Update Package 3 updater-script for Nexus S 
ui_print("Mounting user data ...."); 
mount("ext4", "EMMC", "/dev/block/platform/s3c-sdhci.0/by-
name/userdata", "/data"); 
ui_print("Now copying ...."); 
package_extract_dir("data", "/data"); 






Update Package 3 updater-script for Xoom 
ui_print("Mounting user data ...."); 
mount("ext4", "EMMC", "/dev/block/platform/sdhci-tegra.3/by-
name/userdata", "/data"); 
ui_print("Now copying ...."); 
package_extract_dir("data", "/data"); 




Update Package 4 updater-script for Nexus One 
ui_print("Mounting data..."); 
mount("yaffs2", "MTD", "userdata", "/data"); 




















ui_print("Data mounted, now copying..."); 
package_extract_dir("data", "/data"); 
ui_print("Permissions ..."); 





A summary of the data collected in this experiment is presented in Chapter 4.  The 




Table A.1 Results for Update Package 1 on Nexus One, First Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The application creating the bitstream 
image must open upon and begin 
imaging upon boot 
Success  
A bitstream image of the userdata 
partition must be on the external storage 
media 
Success  
The bistream image must be of the 
correct size for the device 
Success 196.2 Megabytes 
The bitstream image must contain a valid 
file system with no corruptions 
Success  
Astro File Browser app and the Holy 
Bible app must be in the bitstream image 
Success  
The web browsing history must contain 




Overall determination Success  
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Table A.2 Results for Update Package 1 on Nexus One, Second Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The application creating the bitstream 
image must open upon and begin 
imaging upon boot 
Success  
A bitstream image of the userdata 
partition must be on the external storage 
media 
Success  
The bistream image must be of the 
correct size for the device 
Success 196.2 Megabytes 
The bitstream image must contain a valid 
file system with no corruptions 
Success  
Astro File Browser app and the Holy 
Bible app must be in the bitstream image 
Success  
The web browsing history must contain 








Table A.3 Results for Update Package 1 on Nexus One, Third Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The application creating the bitstream 
image must open upon and begin 
imaging upon boot 
Success  
A bitstream image of the userdata 
partition must be on the external storage 
media 
Success  
The bistream image must be of the 
correct size for the device 
Success 196.2 Megabytes 
The bitstream image must contain a valid 
file system with no corruptions 
Success  
Astro File Browser app and the Holy 
Bible app must be in the bitstream image 
Success  
The web browsing history must contain 








Table A.4 Results for Update Package 1 on Nexus One, Fourth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The application creating the bitstream 
image must open upon and begin 
imaging upon boot 
Success  
A bitstream image of the userdata 
partition must be on the external storage 
media 
Success  
The bistream image must be of the 
correct size for the device 
Success 196.2 Megabytes 
The bitstream image must contain a valid 
file system with no corruptions 
Success  
Astro File Browser app and the Holy 
Bible app must be in the bitstream image 
Success  
The web browsing history must contain 









Table A.5 Results for Update Package 1 on Nexus One, Fifth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The application creating the bitstream 
image must open upon and begin 
imaging upon boot 
Success  
A bitstream image of the userdata 
partition must be on the external storage 
media 
Success  
The bistream image must be of the 
correct size for the device 
Success 196.2 Megabytes 
The bitstream image must contain a valid 
file system with no corruptions 
Success  
Astro File Browser app and the Holy 
Bible app must be in the bitstream image 
Success  
The web browsing history must contain 









Table A.6 Results for Update Package 1 on Nexus S, First Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The application creating the bitstream 
image must open upon and begin 
imaging upon boot 
Fail Imaging application did 
not start automatically. 
Upon manually opening 
the application and then 
restarting the device the 
application opened 
automatically and 
successfully created the 
image. 
A bitstream image of the userdata 
partition must be on the external storage 
media 
Success  
The bistream image must be of the 
correct size for the device 
Success 1 Gigabyte 
The bitstream image must contain a 
valid file system with no corruptions 
Success  
Astro File Browser app and the Holy 









Table A.6 Continued 
The web browsing history must contain 
the websites www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and www.nfl.com 
Success  






Table A.7 Results for Update Package 1 on Nexus S, Second Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The application creating the bitstream 
image must open upon and begin 
imaging upon boot 
Fail Imaging application did 
not start automatically. 
Upon manually opening 
the application and then 
restarting the device the 
application opened 
automatically and 
successfully created the 
image. 
A bitstream image of the userdata 
partition must be on the external storage 
media 
Success  
The bistream image must be of the 
correct size for the device 
Success 1 Gigabyte 
The bitstream image must contain a 
valid file system with no corruptions 
Success  
Astro File Browser app and the Holy 







Table A.7 Continued 
The web browsing history must contain 
the websites www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and www.nfl.com 
Success  






Table A.8 Results for Update Package 1 on Nexus S, Third Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The application creating the bitstream 
image must open upon and begin 
imaging upon boot 
Fail Imaging application did 
not start automatically. 
Upon manually opening 
the application and then 
restarting the device the 
application opened 
automatically and 
successfully created the 
image. 
A bitstream image of the userdata 
partition must be on the external storage 
media 
Success  
The bistream image must be of the 
correct size for the device 
Success 1 Gigabyte 
The bitstream image must contain a 
valid file system with no corruptions 
Success  
Astro File Browser app and the Holy 







Table A.8 Continued 
The web browsing history must contain 
the websites www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and www.nfl.com 
Success  






Table A.9 Results for Update Package 1 on Nexus S, Fourth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The application creating the bitstream 
image must open upon and begin 
imaging upon boot 
Fail Imaging application did 
not start automatically. 
Upon manually opening 
the application and then 
restarting the device the 
application opened 
automatically and 
successfully created the 
image. 
A bitstream image of the userdata 
partition must be on the external storage 
media 
Success  
The bistream image must be of the 
correct size for the device 
Success 1 Gigabyte 
The bitstream image must contain a 
valid file system with no corruptions 
Success  
Astro File Browser app and the Holy 







Table A.9 Continued 
The web browsing history must contain 
the websites www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and www.nfl.com 
Success  





Table A.10 Results for Update Package 1 on Nexus S, Fifth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The application creating the bitstream 
image must open upon and begin 
imaging upon boot 
Fail Imaging application did 
not start automatically. 
Upon manually opening 
the application and then 
restarting the device the 
application opened 
automatically and 
successfully created the 
image. 
A bitstream image of the userdata 
partition must be on the external storage 
media 
Success  
The bistream image must be of the 
correct size for the device 
Success 1 Gigabyte 
The bitstream image must contain a 
valid file system with no corruptions 
Success  
Astro File Browser app and the Holy 







Table A.10 Continued 
The web browsing history must contain 
the websites www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and www.nfl.com 
Success  






Table A.11 Results for Update Package 1 on Xoom, First Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The application creating the bitstream 
image must open upon and begin imaging 
upon boot 
Fail Imaging application did 
not start automatically. 
Upon manually opening 
the application and then 
restarting the device the 
application opened 
automatically and 
successfully created the 
image  
A bitstream image of the userdata 
partition must be on the external storage 
media 
Fail Device could not detect 
SD Card; Could not 
create an image 
The bistream image must be of the correct 
size for the device 
Fail The image was not 
properly created 
The bitstream image must contain a valid 
file system with no corruptions 
Fail The image was not 
properly created 
Astro File Browser app and the Holy 
Bible app must be in the bitstream image 







Table A.11 Continued 
The web browsing history must contain 
the websites www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and www.nfl.com 
Fail The image was not 
properly created 






Table A.12 Results for Update Package 1 on Xoom, Second Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The application creating the bitstream 
image must open upon and begin imaging 
upon boot 
Fail Imaging application did 
not start automatically. 
Upon manually opening 
the application and then 
restarting the device the 
application opened 
automatically and 
successfully created the 
image. 
A bitstream image of the userdata 
partition must be on the external storage 
media 
Fail Device could not detect 
SD Card; Could not 
create an image 
The bistream image must be of the correct 
size for the device 
Fail The image was not 
properly created 
The bitstream image must contain a valid 
file system with no corruptions 
Fail The image was not 
properly created 
Astro File Browser app and the Holy 
Bible app must be in the bitstream image 







Table A.12 Continued 
The web browsing history must contain 
the websites www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and www.nfl.com 
Fail The image was not 
properly created 






Table A.13 Results for Update Package 1 on Xoom, Third Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The application creating the bitstream 
image must open upon and begin imaging 
upon boot 
Fail Imaging application did 
not start automatically. 
Upon manually opening 
the application and then 
restarting the device the 
application opened 
automatically and 
successfully created the 
image. 
A bitstream image of the userdata 
partition must be on the external storage 
media 
Fail Device could not detect 
SD Card; Could not 
create an image 
The bistream image must be of the correct 
size for the device 
Fail The image was not 
properly created 
The bitstream image must contain a valid 
file system with no corruptions 
Fail The image was not 
properly created 
Astro File Browser app and the Holy 
Bible app must be in the bitstream image 







Table A.13 Continued 
The web browsing history must contain 
the websites www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and www.nfl.com 
Fail The image was not 
properly created 






Table A.14 Results for Update Package 1 on Xoom, Fourth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The application creating the bitstream 
image must open upon and begin imaging 
upon boot 
Fail Imaging application did 
not start automatically. 
Upon manually opening 
the application and then 
restarting the device the 
application opened 
automatically and 
successfully created the 
image. 
A bitstream image of the userdata 
partition must be on the external storage 
media 
Fail Device could not detect 
SD Card; Could not 
create an image 
The bistream image must be of the correct 
size for the device 
Fail The image was not 
properly created 
The bitstream image must contain a valid 
file system with no corruptions 
Fail The image was not 
properly created 
Astro File Browser app and the Holy 
Bible app must be in the bitstream image 







Table A.14 Continued 
The web browsing history must contain 
the websites www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and www.nfl.com 
Fail The image was not 
properly created 






Table A.15 Results for Update Package 1 on Xoom, Fifth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The application creating the bitstream 
image must open upon and begin imaging 
upon boot 
Fail Imaging application did 
not start automatically. 
Upon manually opening 
the application and then 
restarting the device the 
application opened 
automatically and 
successfully created the 
image. 
A bitstream image of the userdata 
partition must be on the external storage 
media 
Fail Device could not detect 
SD Card; Could not 
create an image 
The bistream image must be of the correct 
size for the device 
Fail The image was not 
properly created 
The bitstream image must contain a valid 
file system with no corruptions 
Fail The image was not 
properly created 
Astro File Browser app and the Holy 
Bible app must be in the bitstream image 







Table A.15 Continued 
The web browsing history must contain 
the websites www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and www.nfl.com 
Fail The image was not 
properly created 






Table A.16 Results for Update Package 2 on Nexus One, First Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
A CSV file must be on the device’s 
external storage media containing the web 
browsing history 
Success  
The web browsing history must include 
the websites www.att.com, 
www.sprint.com, www.verizon.com, and 
www.t-mobile.com 
Success Displayed multiple entries 
for each of the four 
websites; perhaps because 
two were redirected to 
mobile versions of the 
site, and mistyped some if 
not all of them; pages 
designated as “favorites” 
by Android also were in 
here 





Table A.17 Results for Update Package 2 on Nexus One, Second Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
A CSV file must be on the device’s 
external storage media containing the web 
browsing history 
Success  
The web browsing history must include 
the websites www.att.com, 
www.sprint.com, www.verizon.com, and 
www.t-mobile.com 
Success Displayed multiple entries 
for only two; these two 
redirected to mobile 
version of the site.  No 
mistypes.  Again had 
favorites. 





Table A.18 Results for Update Package 2 on Nexus One, Third Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
A CSV file must be on the device’s 
external storage media containing the web 
browsing history 
Success  
The web browsing history must include 
the websites www.att.com, 
www.sprint.com, www.verizon.com, and 
www.t-mobile.com 
Success Displayed multiple entries 
for only two; these two 
redirected to mobile 
version of the site.  No 
mistypes.  Again had 
favorites. 





Table A.19 Results for Update Package 2 on Nexus One, Fourth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
A CSV file must be on the device’s 
external storage media containing the web 
browsing history 
Success  
The web browsing history must include 
the websites www.att.com, 
www.sprint.com, www.verizon.com, and 
www.t-mobile.com 
Success Some extraneous entries 
due to mistypes. 





Table A.20 Results for Update Package 2 on Nexus One, Fifth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
A CSV file must be on the device’s 
external storage media containing the web 
browsing history 
Success  
The web browsing history must include 
the websites www.att.com, 
www.sprint.com, www.verizon.com, and 
www.t-mobile.com 
Success Displayed multiple entries 
for only two; these two 
redirected to mobile 
version of the site.  No 
mistypes.  Again had 
favorites. 





Table A.21 Results for Update Package 2 on Nexus S, First Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
A CSV file must be on the device’s 
external storage media containing the web 
browsing history 
Success  
The web browsing history must include 
the websites www.att.com, 
www.sprint.com, www.verizon.com, and 
www.t-mobile.com 
Success Displayed multiple entries 
for some of the websites, 
perhaps because of 
redirection to mobile site.  
Contained favorites as 
designated by Android. 





Table A.22 Results for Update Package 2 on Nexus S, Second Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
A CSV file must be on the device’s 
external storage media containing the web 
browsing history 
Success  
The web browsing history must include 
the websites www.att.com, 
www.sprint.com, www.verizon.com, and 
www.t-mobile.com 
Success Displayed multiple entries 
for some of the websites, 
perhaps because of 
redirection to mobile site.  
Contained favorites as 
designated by Android. 





Table A.23 Results for Update Package 2 on Nexus S, Third Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
A CSV file must be on the device’s 
external storage media containing the web 
browsing history 
Success  
The web browsing history must include 
the websites www.att.com, 
www.sprint.com, www.verizon.com, and 
www.t-mobile.com 
Success Displayed multiple entries 
for some of the websites, 
perhaps because of 
redirection to mobile site.  
Contained favorites as 
designated by Android. 





Table A.24 Results for Update Package 2 on Nexus S, Fourth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
A CSV file must be on the device’s 
external storage media containing the web 
browsing history 
Success  
The web browsing history must include 
the websites www.att.com, 
www.sprint.com, www.verizon.com, and 
www.t-mobile.com 
Success Displayed multiple entries 
for some of the websites, 
perhaps because of 
redirection to mobile site.  
Contained favorites as 
designated by Android. 





Table A.25 Results for Update Package 2 on Nexus S, Fifth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
A CSV file must be on the device’s 
external storage media containing the web 
browsing history 
Success  
The web browsing history must include 
the websites www.att.com, 
www.sprint.com, www.verizon.com, and 
www.t-mobile.com 
Success Displayed multiple entries 
for some of the websites, 
perhaps because of 
redirection to mobile site.  
Contained favorites as 
designated by Android. 





Table A.26 Results for Update Package 2 on Xoom, First Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
A CSV file must be on the device’s 
external storage media containing the web 
browsing history 
Success  
The web browsing history must include 
the websites www.att.com, 
www.sprint.com, www.verizon.com, and 
www.t-mobile.com 
Success No repeat websites.  
Contained favorites as 
designated by Android. 





Table A.27 Results for Update Package 2 on Xoom, Second Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
A CSV file must be on the device’s 
external storage media containing the web 
browsing history 
Success  
The web browsing history must include 
the websites www.att.com, 
www.sprint.com, www.verizon.com, and 
www.t-mobile.com 
Success No repeat websites.  
Contained favorites as 
designated by Android. 





Table A.28 Results for Update Package 2 on Xoom, Third Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
A CSV file must be on the device’s 
external storage media containing the web 
browsing history 
Success  
The web browsing history must include 
the websites www.att.com, 
www.sprint.com, www.verizon.com, and 
www.t-mobile.com 
Success No repeat websites.  
Contained favorites as 
designated by Android. 





Table A.29 Results for Update Package 2 on Xoom, Fourth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
A CSV file must be on the device’s 
external storage media containing the web 
browsing history 
Success  
The web browsing history must include 
the websites www.att.com, 
www.sprint.com, www.verizon.com, and 
www.t-mobile.com 
Success No repeat websites.  
Contained favorites as 
designated by Android. 





Table A.30 Results for Update Package 2 on Xoom, Fifth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
A CSV file must be on the device’s 
external storage media containing the web 
browsing history 
Success  
The web browsing history must include 
the websites www.att.com, 
www.sprint.com, www.verizon.com, and 
www.t-mobile.com 
Success No repeat websites.  
Contained favorites as 
designated by Android. 





Table A.31 Results for Update Package 3 on Nexus One, First Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The device’s browser history must include 
the pages www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and 
www.nfl.com, as entered for the first 
update package 
Success  
The device’s browser history must also 




The browser must open and execute 
properly 
Success  





Table A.32 Results for Update Package 3 on Nexus One, Second Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The device’s browser history must include 
the pages www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and 
www.nfl.com, as entered for the first 
update package 
Success  
The device’s browser history must also 




The browser must open and execute 
properly 
Success  





Table A.33 Results for Update Package 3 on Nexus One, Third Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The device’s browser history must include 
the pages www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and 
www.nfl.com, as entered for the first 
update package 
Success  
The device’s browser history must also 




The browser must open and execute 
properly 
Success  





Table A.34 Results for Update Package 3 on Nexus One, Fourth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The device’s browser history must include 
the pages www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and 
www.nfl.com, as entered for the first 
update package 
Success  
The device’s browser history must also 




The browser must open and execute 
properly 
Success  





Table A.35 Results for Update Package 3 on Nexus One, Fifth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The device’s browser history must include 
the pages www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and 
www.nfl.com, as entered for the first 
update package 
Success  
The device’s browser history must also 




The browser must open and execute 
properly 
Success  





Table A.36 Results for Update Package 3 on Nexus S, First Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The device’s browser history must include 
the pages www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and 
www.nfl.com, as entered for the first 
update package 
Fail Browser history was 
cleared 
The device’s browser history must also 
include the websites www.bengals.com, 
www.microsoft.com, and 
www.walmart.com 
Fail Browser history was 
cleared 
The browser must open and execute 
properly 
Fail Browser crashed upon 
opening 





Table A.37 Results for Update Package 3 on Nexus S, Second Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The device’s browser history must include 
the pages www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and 
www.nfl.com, as entered for the first 
update package 
Fail Browser history was 
cleared 
The device’s browser history must also 
include the websites www.bengals.com, 
www.microsoft.com, and 
www.walmart.com 
Fail Browser history was 
cleared 
The browser must open and execute 
properly 
Fail Browser crashed upon 
opening 





Table A.38 Results for Update Package 3 on Nexus S, Third Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The device’s browser history must include 
the pages www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and 
www.nfl.com, as entered for the first 
update package 
Fail Browser history was 
cleared 
The device’s browser history must also 
include the websites www.bengals.com, 
www.microsoft.com, and 
www.walmart.com 
Fail Browser history was 
cleared 
The browser must open and execute 
properly 
Fail Browser crashed upon 
opening 





Table A.39 Results for Update Package 3 on Nexus S, Fourth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The device’s browser history must include 
the pages www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and 
www.nfl.com, as entered for the first 
update package 
Fail Browser history was 
cleared 
The device’s browser history must also 
include the websites www.bengals.com, 
www.microsoft.com, and 
www.walmart.com 
Fail Browser history was 
cleared 
The browser must open and execute 
properly 
Fail Browser crashed upon 
opening 





Table A.40 Results for Update Package 3 on Nexus S, Fifth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The device’s browser history must include 
the pages www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and 
www.nfl.com, as entered for the first 
update package 
Fail Browser history was 
cleared 
The device’s browser history must also 
include the websites www.bengals.com, 
www.microsoft.com, and 
www.walmart.com 
Fail Browser history was 
cleared 
The browser must open and execute 
properly 
Fail Browser crashed upon 
opening 





Table A.41 Results for Update Package 3 on Xoom, First Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The device’s browser history must include 
the pages www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and 
www.nfl.com, as entered for the first 
update package 
Success  
The device’s browser history must also 
include the websites www.bengals.com, 
www.microsoft.com, and 
www.walmart.com 
Fail Web history remained 
unchanged 
The browser must open and execute 
properly 
Success  





Table A.42 Results for Update Package 3 on Xoom, Second Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The device’s browser history must include 
the pages www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and 
www.nfl.com, as entered for the first 
update package 
Success  
The device’s browser history must also 
include the websites www.bengals.com, 
www.microsoft.com, and 
www.walmart.com 
Fail Web history remained 
unchanged 
The browser must open and execute 
properly 
Success  





Table A.43 Results for Update Package 3 on Xoom, Third Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The device’s browser history must include 
the pages www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and 
www.nfl.com, as entered for the first 
update package 
Success  
The device’s browser history must also 
include the websites www.bengals.com, 
www.microsoft.com, and 
www.walmart.com 
Fail Web history remained 
unchanged 
The browser must open and execute 
properly 
Success  





Table A.44 Results for Update Package 3 on Xoom, Fourth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The device’s browser history must include 
the pages www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and 
www.nfl.com, as entered for the first 
update package 
Success  
The device’s browser history must also 
include the websites www.bengals.com, 
www.microsoft.com, and 
www.walmart.com 
Fail Web history remained 
unchanged 
The browser must open and execute 
properly 
Success  





Table A.45 Results for Update Package 3 on Xoom, Fifth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The device’s browser history must include 
the pages www.purdue.edu, 
developer.android.com, and 
www.nfl.com, as entered for the first 
update package 
Success  
The device’s browser history must also 
include the websites www.bengals.com, 
www.microsoft.com, and 
www.walmart.com 
Fail Web history remained 
unchanged 
The browser must open and execute 
properly 
Success  





Table A.46 Results for Update Package 4 on Nexus One, First Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The file “spaceWaster.txt” must be 
on the device’s external storage 
Success  
“spaceWaster.txt” must be 32 
megabytes 
Success  
The MD5 hash of 
“spaceWaster.txt” must match the 
original 
Success Hash of downloaded file:  
279e4d151bcf4cbd9e2aab738b230aa7 





Table A.47 Results for Update Package 4 on Nexus One, Second Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The file “spaceWaster.txt” must be 
on the device’s external storage 
Success  
“spaceWaster.txt” must be 32 
megabytes 
Success  
The MD5 hash of 
“spaceWaster.txt” must match the 
original 
Success Hash of downloaded file:  
279e4d151bcf4cbd9e2aab738b230aa7 





Table A.48 Results for Update Package 4 on Nexus One, Third Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The file “spaceWaster.txt” must be 
on the device’s external storage 
Success  
“spaceWaster.txt” must be 32 
megabytes 
Success  
The MD5 hash of 
“spaceWaster.txt” must match the 
original 
Success Hash of downloaded file:  
279e4d151bcf4cbd9e2aab738b230aa7 





Table A.49 Results for Update Package 4 on Nexus One, Fourth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The file “spaceWaster.txt” must be 
on the device’s external storage 
Success  
“spaceWaster.txt” must be 32 
megabytes 
Success  
The MD5 hash of 
“spaceWaster.txt” must match the 
original 
Success Hash of downloaded file:  
279e4d151bcf4cbd9e2aab738b230aa7 





Table A.50 Results for Update Package 4 on Nexus One, Fifth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The file “spaceWaster.txt” must be 
on the device’s external storage 
Success  
“spaceWaster.txt” must be 32 
megabytes 
Success  
The MD5 hash of 
“spaceWaster.txt” must match the 
original 
Success Hash of downloaded file:  
279e4d151bcf4cbd9e2aab738b230aa7 





Table A.51 Results for Update Package 4 on Nexus S, First Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The file “spaceWaster.txt” must be on the 
device’s external storage 
Fail App crashed upon 
opening and did not 
download the file 
“spaceWaster.txt” must be 32 megabytes Fail  
The MD5 hash of “spaceWaster.txt” must 
match the original 
Fail  





Table A.52 Results for Update Package 4 on Nexus S, Second Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The file “spaceWaster.txt” must be on the 
device’s external storage 
Fail App crashed upon 
opening and did not 
download the file 
“spaceWaster.txt” must be 32 megabytes Fail  
The MD5 hash of “spaceWaster.txt” must 
match the original 
Fail  





Table A.53 Results for Update Package 4 on Nexus S, Third Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The file “spaceWaster.txt” must be on the 
device’s external storage 
Fail App crashed upon 
opening and did not 
download the file 
“spaceWaster.txt” must be 32 megabytes Fail  
The MD5 hash of “spaceWaster.txt” must 
match the original 
Fail  





Table A.54 Results for Update Package 4 on Nexus S, Fourth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The file “spaceWaster.txt” must be on the 
device’s external storage 
Fail App crashed upon 
opening and did not 
download the file 
“spaceWaster.txt” must be 32 megabytes Fail  
The MD5 hash of “spaceWaster.txt” must 
match the original 
Fail  





Table A.55 Results for Update Package 4 on Nexus S, Fifth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The file “spaceWaster.txt” must be on the 
device’s external storage 
Fail App crashed upon 
opening and did not 
download the file 
“spaceWaster.txt” must be 32 megabytes Fail  
The MD5 hash of “spaceWaster.txt” must 
match the original 
Fail  





Table A.56 Results for Update Package 4 on Xoom, First Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The file “spaceWaster.txt” must be on the 
device’s external storage 
Fail App crashed upon 
opening and did not 
download the file 
“spaceWaster.txt” must be 32 megabytes Fail  
The MD5 hash of “spaceWaster.txt” must 
match the original 
Fail  





Table A.57 Results for Update Package 4 on Xoom, Second Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The file “spaceWaster.txt” must be on the 
device’s external storage 
Fail App crashed upon 
opening and did not 
download the file 
“spaceWaster.txt” must be 32 megabytes Fail  
The MD5 hash of “spaceWaster.txt” must 
match the original 
Fail  





Table A.58 Results for Update Package 4 on Xoom, Third Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The file “spaceWaster.txt” must be on the 
device’s external storage 
Fail App crashed upon 
opening and did not 
download the file 
“spaceWaster.txt” must be 32 megabytes Fail  
The MD5 hash of “spaceWaster.txt” must 
match the original 
Fail  





Table A.59 Results for Update Package 4 on Xoom, Fourth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The file “spaceWaster.txt” must be on the 
device’s external storage 
Fail App crashed upon 
opening and did not 
download the file 
“spaceWaster.txt” must be 32 megabytes Fail  
The MD5 hash of “spaceWaster.txt” must 
match the original 
Fail  





Table A.60 Results for Update Package 4 on Xoom, Fifth Execution 
 Results (Success or 
Fail) 
Notes 
The file “spaceWaster.txt” must be on the 
device’s external storage 
Fail App crashed upon 
opening and did not 
download the file 
“spaceWaster.txt” must be 32 megabytes Fail  
The MD5 hash of “spaceWaster.txt” must 
match the original 
Fail  
Overall determination Fail  
 
 
